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ABSTRACT

Bodily Poetics: The Rhetorical Politics of the Self
by
Allison Renée Kaminsky
Dr. Donovan Conley, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor o f Communieation Studies
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis will examine different ways people eonsciously manipulate their
bodies in order to express selfhood, artieulate identities, fulfill desires, and signal social
and political commitments. The major premise o f this research is that bodies are
rhetorically constructed through a series o f fundamental assumptions about selfhood,
social ideals and aeeeptability, and political struggle. This paper argues that there are no a
priori distinctions between the various practices and meanings o f body modification. The
way we think about body modification is based on a series o f assumptions that define
each practice. This project will look at three different groupings o f modification
organized around the subjective desires they express: Those articulating desires about 1)
Interiority; 2) Acceptability; and 3) Struggle. 1 problematize the assumptions underlying
these practices in order to gain insight into the sheer rhetoricity o f the body, and to
exemplify the central role rhetoric has in framing the uses and functions o f our bodies.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
Western culture articulates the human body in strange ways. Classic children’s
stories signify characters’ inner selves with outward appearances, joining the aesthetic
quality o f the human form with an ethie o f inner worth. It is no coincidence that Glenda,
the “good” witch in “The Wizard o f Oz,” is a young, beautiful woman, whereas the
Wicked Witch of the West— who does not even merit a real name— possesses gnarled,
inhuman-like physical features. Other tales, such as “The Ugly Duckling.” link
attractiveness with happiness and social aeeeptanee. Children who are told this story
understand that while the duckling was never inherently bad or evil, it was not until his
transformation into a beautiful swan that he was treated fairly and accepted among his
peers. The widely known myth o f the fountain o f youth tells a story o f a mystical spring
that Hows with the “water o f lite.” Drinking this water will not just ensure longevity, but
will restore the “desirable” physical qualities o f youthfulness, situating these qualities as
ideal. Then, o f course, there’s Barbie, the world’s most well-known and best selling doll.
The original model is a tall, slender, Caucasian woman with blonde hair, large breasts,
wide hips, and a tiny waist. Presenting an unattainable and unrealistic body type to young
children— it has been said that if Barbie were made to scale, she would be 7’2” at 115
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pounds— the doll has sparked controversy among critics arguing that the doll encourages
poor body image and promotes stereotyping.
These narratives and images are common in American culture, and when pieced
together they provide a picture o f how our society understands and values the human
body. Popular representations o f the body equate beauty with happiness, sexual appeal
with power, thinness with health, and youthfulness with success and magnetism. As
individuals have come to understand the physical condition through these socially
constructed narratives, it is clear that the human form has become a central medium in the
construction and dissemination o f social and political meaning. Individuals have come to
subjectively evaluate their bodies and routinely use them to craft and project a desired
self to achieve personal, social and political goals. The body may thus be envisioned as a
dynamic text that both alters and is altered by its cultural context, making the body a site
o f personal, social, and political struggle where cultural meaning-making takes place.
According to Mike Feather stone, the term “body modification” is used to refer to
“a long list o f practices ... to alter the appearance and form o f the body” (“Body
Modification: An Introduction” 1). This general definition posits that any practice that
physically or aesthetically alters the human form may be construed as body modification.
However, if this is the ease, why is it that some practices are considered acceptable,
productive, or even necessary practices o f everyday life, while others are considered
unacceptable, unproductive, recreational, or even self-destructive? If one distances
him/herself from previous experiences and personal biases regarding body modification,
it becomes apparent that all methods o f corporeal alteration fall on a singular continuum
o f bodily practices. If the cultural connotations o f the term “body modification” are
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stripped away, acts socially understood as self-maintenance— such as bleaching teeth,
coloring, shaving or cutting hair, and even dieting and weight training— may be placed
alongside practices that are socially regarded as body modification— such as cosmetic
surgery, tattooing or piercing the skin— or even body mutilation— such as selfflagellation or “cutting.” The ways in which we generally understand the body and its
modification are cultural myths that are rhetorically produced and perpetuated.
There are many ways people manipulate their physical appearance in order to
attain a desired projection o f themselves. Pop singers like Madonna and David Bowie
have made their careers on the “reinvention” o f their images to coincide with the release
o f a new album. Roche Pharmaceuticals develops products like Acutane that clear facial
blemishes, yet have the potential to cause birth defects and traumatize the liver. Dennis
Rodman became famous more for his bizarre and sudden changes o f appearance—
constantly adding new piercings, tattoos, and hair colors— than for his athletic prowess.
Cheers and Look Who's Talking star Kirstie Alley drew heavy media attention when her
weight peaked at over 200 pounds in 2005, and has achieved her greatest fame for her
dramatic weight loss. As the spokeswoman for .lenny Craig, television advertisements
actually document her weight loss. And o f course Oprah W infrey's infamous weight
gains and losses have continuously gained the attention o f the national media.
Body modification has also become one o f the central obsessions o f the reality
television phenomenon. Programs like “Inked,” “Miami Ink,” “Dr. 90210,” “Extreme
Makeover,” “The Biggest Loser,” and “1 Want a Famous Face,” for instance, follow the
everyday dramas o f subjects engaging heavily in spectacular forms o f body modification.
These programs fixate on the physical self “improvement” or enhancement o f everyday
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people, equating the very aet of transformation with success, happiness, and prosperity.
The industry o f cosmetic and reconstructive surgery has capitalized on this articulation,
presenting a slimmer waist, clearer skin, bigger breasts, and tighter skin as the paths to
beauty, luxury, inner happiness, and even love.
Because o f the growing accessibility and affordability o f plastic surgery, as well
as the increased visibility o f such practices through celebrity participation and
endorsement, Americans have become more willing to participate in spectacular forms of
body modification and have become more accepting o f pioneering self-modifiers. It is no
wonder that, according to the American Society o f Plastic Surgeons, American spending
on plastic surgery has grown 38 percent over the past five years to reach $9.4 billion in
2005.' Many Americans have incorporated intense self-maintenanee strategies into their
everyday lives, bleaching their teeth, coloring their hair, removing unwanted body hair,
and wearing colored contacts to attain a desired projection of their physical self. Recent
technological developments have even made it possible for individuals to be sexually
“reassigned” to match their identified gender. The voluntary participation in these
processes can come from any number o f motivations, but one fact is undeniably clear:
Americans are obsessed with their bodies. More to the point, Americans have become
obsessed with changing their bodies. Our society has become fixated on transforming our
physical selves in order to attain some ideal conception o f what we think we should look
like, feel like, and be like, constantly developing and employing new technologies and
practices to “improve” our corporeal form.
With such emphasis put on the image, on attractiveness, on sexual appeal, on
individuality— in short, on the aesthetic pliability o f the self—“the body” has in recent
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decades drawn the attention o f academics. As I demonstrate below, in recent years the
pool o f research on the embodied self has grown substantially across the social sciences
and the humanities. Research on the body has become routine in fields like sociology,
cultural studies, gender studies, philosophy, and literary theory.
Yet, while the interest in the body has peaked in recent decent, there has only
been a limited discussion on its significance to the field o f rhetoric. Further, though other
disciplines have begun to delve into the analysis o f body modification, rhetoricians have
thus far only acknowledged its presence as a marginal social activity and political
resource. There has been some argument for the admission o f the corporeal form into
analytic thought, but rhetorical scholarship is generally far more interested in questions
about “the subject” or “ethos” than on the materiality or agency o f the self. For example,
Bradford Vivian discusses the historicity o f the subject at length in his essay “The
1hreshold o f the Self.” Though his essay clearly addresses issues o f both materiality and
subjectifi cation, his discussion o f the “continual becoming o f the s e lf’ (304) omits any
discussion o f the body itself.
This project will examine different ways people consciously manipulate their
bodies in order to express selfhood, articulate identities, fulfill desires, and achieve social
and political outcomes. The major premise o f this research is that bodies are rhetorically
constructed through a series o f fundamental assumptions about selfhood, social ideals and
aeeeptability, and political reform. In other words, practices o f body modification are the
products o f two interrelated forces: social norms and subjective desires, both o f which are
discursively negotiated. Practices o f body modification are normatively thought o f as
healthful or harmful, acquiescent or resistant, productive or destructive, acceptable or
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unacceptable, meaningful or trivial; they are socially categorized as functioning in any
number of ways based on the individual’s intention and how that practice relates to a
larger set o f cultural norms. It is my aim in this project to interrogate these basic
assumptions about the body in order to open up space for the potential for the body to be
meaningful in new ways.
Clearly, additional questions centering on the human body are necessary to
provide a more complete understanding o f how rhetoric operates as a material force, and
also how the physical can be seen as discursive in its own respect. The following section
will illuminate the need to acknowledge the rhetoricity o f bodily practices and call
attention to the immediacy that issues o f the body raise to the field o f rhetoric.

Rationale

Analyzing the rhetoricity o f the body will provide insight into how individuals use
alterations o f their physical form as the raw material o f socialization, persuasion,
identification, and resistance, as well as a site for the negotiation o f meaning and action.
For example, in some cases, tattoos and piercings have qualities o f socialization and
identification that signal membership into spectacular subcultures. Since it is commonly
understood that the expression o f difference is the primary communicative function of
spectacular subcultures (Hebdige 1979), the practice o f adorning one’s body in a
particular style can be understood to indicate commonalities among members of
con esponding ideologies (Sweet 2005). Another example is the use o f plastic surgery to
keep or advance to a desirable career. According to Christine Rosen, many “executives—
male and female— are turning to cosmetic surgery to help them stay competitive” (“The
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Democratization o f Beauty” 23). These professionals are using their bodies as persuasive
media, convineing their employers that they are still motivated, vigorous and capable
enough to secure or maintain a fast paced or high profile job. Modifying one’s own
physical condition with the intention o f personal, social, or political mobility can thus be
seen as a strategic rhetorical aet o f the self.
A closer look at how issues o f the body are culturally featured and articulated will
provide deeper insight into how discourse situates the body’s importance in society and
how this status is preserved. Further, rhetoricians may gain a deeper understanding o f the
materiality o f discourse. Consideration as such will contribute to discussions o f what
Carole Blair has called “extra linguistic rhetorics” (“Reflections on Criticism and Bodies”
273), the rhetorical dimensions o f the human body, and the corporeal dimensions o f
rhetorical acts. Ultimately, through the investigation o f these body modification practices,
this project seeks to gauge the significance o f the body as a site o f analysis in rhetorical
studies.
This thesis argues that there are no a priori distinctions between the various
practices and meanings o f body modification. The way we think about body modification
is based on a series o f assumptions that partially determine each practice. Whereas
shaving our legs, trimming our beards, clipping our nails, and styling our hair are thought
o f as practices of good hygiene, there is no fundamental difference between these
practices and those that are thought o f socially as self-mutilation, such as facial piercing,
scarification, and suspension tactics. These distinctions are rhetorical constructions. If we
do not presume that these practices have presupposed categorical differences, we may
then understand these physical manipulations as existing on a sliding continuum o f body

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

modification practices, all o f which are fundamentally similar, distinct only in the
meanings we attach to them.
In order to make this argument, the project will look at three different groupings
o f modification organized around the subjective desires— the intentions and
motivations— they express: Those articulating desires about 1) Interiority; 2)
Acceptability; and 3) Struggle. Intentionality, an inherently problematic term, is used
here to the extent that we have an awareness o f our own choices and actions. ^ This
project is based on the assumption that cultural practices shape and are shaped by their
social and political realities, thus linking materiality with subjectivity. 1 envision the two
to be mutually co-constitutive, each influencing and constraining the other. The project
will deconstruct the assumptions and beliefs underwriting these practices o f modification
in order to reveal how these practices are assigned meaning. 1 problematize the
assumptions underlying these practices in order to gain new insight into the rhetorical
politics o f the body. In deconstructing the assumptions driving the various practices o f
modification, my goal is not to trivialize or discount them. Rather, 1 want to argue that
how these practices matter is often misrepresented and/or misunderstood by both the
modifier and spectator. It is only after we have critically examined the underlying cultural
norms and beliefs o f the body and its practices o f modification that we can salvage
alternative meanings and inventional tactics.
For the purpose o f analysis, this project will focus only on the subject of
voluntary and intentional body modification. Because o f the dynamic nature of the
human body, this focus makes the distinction between the ""naturar evolution and
transformation of the body through time and space, on the one hand, and the 'dntentionar
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practice o f altering one’s own physical form on the other. In other words, my
conceptualization o f body modification separates the natural development o f the human
form from infancy to adulthood from those cultural practices that aesthetically transform
the body through imposed or external means. This focus also rules out alterations made to
the body that are not carried out by the will o f the individual him/herself. For example,
this separation distinguishes between the sears o f a burn victim and scars that result from
a conscious decision to brand the skin.
Beginning at the level o f intentionality, then, I will examine practices as they are
believed to function within these categories, and then discuss how these practices meet up
with effects. In other words, 1 will juxtapose intention with effectivity and propose a
nuaneed way of thinking about the potential uses and significations o f these practices. In
doing so, 1 aim to provide a new understanding o f the rhetorical dimensions o f the body,
as well as exemplify the central role rhetoric has in framing the uses and functions o f our
bodies. Only after this has been done can the body’s potential for cultural and political
signification be realized.
The next section briefly outlines relevant scholarship that assists a discussion of
the rhetoricity o f the body. Further, it provides key theories that aid my conceptualization
of bodies, body modification, and the ways in which the body can be rhetorically
considered.

L iterature R eview

Rhetorical interest in the category o f subjectivity has inevitable, if often ignored,
ties to the body, as it is concerned with how individuals exist within and understand the
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world. Kenneth Burke’s famous definition o f man is eareful to point out, we are not just
symbol users, we are symbol-using animals. Burke’s discussion o f mortification, too,
directly deals with embodied symbolic processes, as the deliberate acts o f “penance,
abstinence or painful severities inflicted on the body” {The Rhetoric o f Religion: Studies
in Logology 289) are enacted as a form o f purification or self-governanee. In her essay
“Language as Sensuous Action,” Debra Hawhee discusses how bodies and physical
expression are inherently linked. In this essay, Hawhee argues for a conceptualization of
discourse o f bodily formation, as opposed to the body as discursive formation. These are
but a few examples o f how issues o f the body have figured into recent rhetorical theory.
However, as Gerard Hauser observes, scholars have only recently begun to explicitly
focus on the body as a uniquely discursive vehicle, and feminist scholars have lead the
way (136).
While feminist scholars have studied the female body as a locus o f meaning and
experience, the discussion o f generalized bodies and the male body has been a common
topic for philosophers such as Nietzehe and Foucault. Such philosophers are considered
as theorists o f corporeal inscription, and are attributed with “freeing the body from the
subordination to the mind” (Grosz 12). For example, Michael Foucault conceptualizes the
generalized body in relation to power structures.^ He states; “the body is also directly
involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they must
invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to
emit signs” {Discipline and Punish 173). Providing a notion o f power to which the body
plays a central role, and arguing for a rhetorical situation in which knowledge, discourse,
and power are indefinitely interconnected, Foucault’s discussion implieityly links the

10
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body to rhetoric. Also, his discussion o f “docile bodies” as the site o f subjectification
through discipline is heavily cited in academic works regarding the body. His work set
the stage for the more recent studies on the body.
Judith Butler is the foremost player in feminist literature regarding the reading of
the body. Butler posits that there is no “real” gender, but that gender is a set o f
strategically manipulated signs and codes imposed on the mind and body (“Gender
Trouble” 1990). This approach views gender, and thus the gendered body, as a cultural
construct. In her later work, Butler complicates traditional conceptions o f the body,
stating that sex is “an ideal construct which is forcibly materialized through time”
(“Bodies that Matter” 1). She argues that the body cannot be seen as extra-discursive, and
that it and the body and the ways in which we understand the body are constrained by
discourse. This argument is comparable with theories o f innovative rhetorical thinkers,
such as Maurice Chari and, who conceptualizes the audience as constituted by discourse.
Both o f these works are paramount in the consideration o f the body as it exists within a
discursive context. These studies, though helpful in envisioning the body as a site of
political struggle, are limited in their focus on the female gendered body, steering the
conversation away from m en’s bodies, or perhaps the generalized or un-gendered body.
In another feminist text, Susan Bordo’s discussion o f the body is threefold; as a
medium o f culture, as a symbolic form, and as a metaphor (1989). She considers the body
to be both a text of culture as well as a “practical, direct locus o f social control” (91). Her
conceptualization of how the body constitutes culture through everyday practices
illuminates the constitutive rhetorical power o f embodied performance. Further, she
discusses the preoccupation with the discipline and modification o f the female body to

11
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attain the aesthetic ideal o f femininity as “the maintenance and reproduction o f existing
power relations” (93). This perspective envisions these practices as occurring within a
context of patriarchal hegemony, requiring that women enact and reinforce their own
submissiveness to a dominating male authority.
Scholars in cultural studies have also reconsidered traditional understandings o f
human body. According to Mike Featherstone, the body and its image are traditionally
conceived in such a way that perpetuates the mind/body split. Featherstone argues that
this understanding o f the body falls short o f the need to envision the body’s “potential to
vary, to be inventive, to be always in motion” (233) and is “open to ‘colonization’ and
reconstitution through a range o f technologies and body projects such as plastic surgery,
body maintenance, health fitness and diet regimes.” (234). The approach to an
understanding o f the body as a project is important for the consideration o f body
modification as rhetorical action, as it situates the body as a malleable social process that
is acted upon by the subject. Further, Featherstone’s perspective on body image
reinforces the sentiment that “body texts” must be understood in social action.
Featherstone breaks down modern concepts o f the body into two different categories:
“body image,” which is the static image o f the body where its physical appearance is
“based upon the body as an object” (234), and “the body without and image,” where the
body is envisioned through an oscillation between subject and object, resulting in an
accumulation o f perspectives. Thus, in this line o f thought, the body is thought o f as both
an extension o f the psychological self and as a social object to be acted upon.
Featherstone calls for a further examination o f the “unmediated participation of
the fiesh in the image.” (235). He also argues that the presence o f new media enhances

12
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the role o f the body in the “crucial creative filter o f images” and focuses on the body as
“a framer o f information.” (235). He calls for a conceptualization o f the body without
image that brings the study o f affect into the center o f our understanding o f embodied
knowledge. Clearly, Featherstone’s vision o f the body as a project calls for further
investigation into these projects as they are acted out and on how this is affected by how
the media frames such practices. According to Featherstone’s perspective, the body plays
a central role in framing information, thus interactively linking the mind and the body.
This allows for a dynamic conceptualization o f the body that cannot be studied in a single
instance. Instead, this approach requires that we understand the body as an ongoing
project. Also, Featherstone’s call for an affective understanding o f body projects prompts
this study’s investigation into actual practices and how these practices are framed by the
media. In doing so, this project seeks to understand body modification projects from
within a contextual relationship to the self and its private and social existence within a
cultural environment.
Hawhee’s discussion o f the body in ancient Greece is a helpful reference point to
illustrate the intersection between the human body and rhetorical studies. According to
Hawhee, the body and rhetoric “came together as bodily arts that reinforced and
perpetuated the lively culture o f contact, movement, and sound so markedly Athenian”
(191). She sees the body as playing a major role in the cultivation o f public knowledge,
and when combined with language as having a constitutive effect on Greek society.
Hawhee, among several others, advocates that the mind and the body should not be
polarized, and that an understanding o f one requires the incorporation o f the other. Her
approach presents a useful model for considering the rhetorical roles the human body
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plays in the creation o f social and political meaning. Though a helpful integration o f the
worlds o f rhetorical, cultural, and literary studies, Hawhee’s discussion provides limited
resources for an understanding o f how the body functions in contemporary rhetorical
theory. Because o f the increased availability o f information, the public sphere is
bombarded with messages and images through which we construct our social realities,
resulting in the constant shifting o f the state o f public knowledge. This condition makes
representations of the human body widely accessible to the masses, potentially altering
how the public consumes these images and how meaning is assigned to them. Clearly,
any assessment of how the body functions in contemporary meaning making processes
must make these considerations.
Carole Blair suggests that though the “material” has traditionally been understood
as a characteristic o f rhetorical context, a “rethinking o f rhetoric as itself material” is a
necessary move in rhetorical theory. In her essay “Contemporary U.S. Memorial Sites as
Exemplars o f Rhetoric’s Materiality,” Blair posits two complications to a consideration
of rhetoric as such. First, she claims that theorists have discussed rhetorical acts as
defined by their symbolieity instead o f their materiality in traditional rhetorical studies,
thus limiting the debates in rhetoric to the level of the discussion of symbols. This
reliance on a model o f rhetoric as symbolic, she argues, is inadequate for critics “who
have advanced other ‘units’ o f analysis to describe rhetorical formulations” (19). Another
obstacle that Blair discusses is the view o f rhetorical practice as goal oriented and under
the control o f the rhetor, which produces “an exceptionally narrow understanding o f
effect” (21). This traditional understanding does not account for effects that are not
contained within the goal-orientation o f a rhetorical text or within the perceptual field of
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a rhetor. The negligence of traditional scholars to consider “that rhetoric is not
exclusively about production” and that it “has consequences that exceed goal fulfillment”
(22) is characterized by Blair as an “anxiety” about rhetoric’s materiality. Ultimately,
Blair argues that it is the responsibility o f contemporary rhetoricians to acknowledge and
understand the material forces operating beyond what is traditionally conceptualized as
“effect,” and to recognize the importance o f asking what a text does as opposed to what it
means. Since Blair observes that different “degrees, kinds, and consequences o f
materiality seem to differ significantly, but rather unpredictably” (17), she suggests that
rhetoricians should attend to “instances o f rhetoric and what they can tell us about their
own materiality” (23). In other words, she advocates an analysis that is unique to the
study o f the cultural object and favors effectivity over contextually-oriented emphasis on
effectivity over effect.
Though Blair suggests that “rhetoric o f all kinds acts on the whole person— body
as well as mind” (46), she offers little direct analysis o f the body itself. However, her
work provides a useful “way in” for the study o f the human body as rhetoric. Blair offers
a series o f questions that prove to be useful in the consideration o f the material as
rhetoric.'^ In addition, she centralizes the notion o f effectivity, as opposed to effect, in the
study o f material rhetoric, thus offering a way to talk about the rhetorical properties of
cultural meanings.
Gerard Hauser’s discussion o f bodily pain presents a useful argument for the
incorporation o f the human body into the consideration o f rhetorical discourse. In his
essay “Body Rhetoric: Conflicted Reporting o f Bodies in Pain,” Hauser explains that the
body in pain has rhetorical power when combined with language. He argues that the
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“body itself is an ambiguous form o f signification” (138), that when combined with
context and words can be viewed as a site o f rhetorical activity. He uses examples o f the
body as site o f political resistance to illustrate this. He then turns to the topic o f publicity
and asserts that how the body is framed in the public sphere alters the body’s rhetorical
functions.
Also calling for a reconeeptualization o f how rhetorical studies approaches the
materiality o f discursive acts, Raymie MeKerrow posits that traditional approaches to
rhetorical theory are unfit for a culturally diverse world, as rhetoric privileges “specific
‘sides' o f diehotomous binaries” (315). O f the many binaries described in his article
“Corporeality and Cultural Rhetoric; A Site for Rhetoric’s future” is the mind/body split.
MeKerrow asserts that traditional rhetorical theorists favor the mind over the body and
argues that the general exclusion o f the body from the discussion o f the public sphere is a
hindrance to achieving a critical rhetoric o f alternative discourse styles. He proposes that
the definition o f rhetoric should be broadened to include what he terms “corporeal
rhetoric” that collapses the binary o f mind and body and “encompasses affective as well
as purely cognitive dimensions o f the human person” (323). Once again calling for a
focus on the material dimensions o f rhetoric, MeKerrow is a key player in bringing the
physical to the center o f rhetorical study. Like Hawhee, his perspective collapses the
dualism between the body and the mind that is perpetuated by traditional rhetorical
theory, making the physical dimensions o f rhetorical activity as important as its linguistic
functions. Adopting the approach to corporeal rhetoric advocated by MeKerrow would
involve tracking the effectivity o f rhetorical discourse, considering the performance o f
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the embodied self as an important variable in the formulation and transmission o f
meaning.
Finally, building on Michael McGee’s fragmentation thesis, Ronald Walter
Greene seeks to replace “traditional” rhetoric’s logic o f representation with a logic o f
articulation in regards to the mass media.^ Because M cGee’s thesis leaves the task o f text
construction to the critic, Greene suggests that the meanings o f social texts do not lie in
how their fragments represent reality, but rather in the articulation o f these fragments into
“a structure o f signification.” (34). In other words, this approach posits that a text’s
meaning is determined by where it is located and how it moves within networks o f power
and usage. Greene suggests, then, that in order to discover a text’s significance, criticism
should be concerned with the mapping o f power relations. This perspective emphasizes a
text’s relation to a larger cultural discourse, and suggests that the meaning o f a text is
determined by where and how it is articulated within this larger context. Meaning, he
argues, is a rhetorical effect o f this articulation, which “generates the possibility o f
rematerializing the political, economic, cultural and affective structures o f public
deliberation as sites o f rhetorical effectivity” (35). Greene suggests that critics should
turn their attention to “how rhetorical practices create the conditions o f possibility ... to
judge and program reality” (22). In other words, Greene’s call for a new materialist
rhetoric weighs the importance o f rhetorical effectivity in a broad range o f social
institutions. The materiality o f rhetorical practices lies in how texts function politically
and aesthetically to figure the process o f subjectivity. Greene’s perspective is important
as it addresses the problem o f accessibility in the meaning-making process. Rhetoric
functions, then, as a method o f making resources available for new articulations. In this
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sense, the representations of the body in mass media texts do not have a direct causal
relationship to how the public feels about the body, but instead create the social
conditions through which we understand and can impact our world. Further, this
conceptualization allows for the consideration o f the intertextual relationship o f physical
bodies. Though assumptions about the body shape and constrain the body, this
perspective accounts for the ways in which our bodies can be envisioned as providing
new resources for the articulation o f bodies within culture. Also, Greene’s approach
focuses the attention o f the critic on a larger cultural discourse, thus emphasizing an
analysis o f rhetorical function over meaning.
This literature review is meant to illustrate some key concepts and major players
that will facilitate my study o f the human body, as well as feature ways the human body
has been discussed in the academic world. The list is not a complete survey o f scholarly
theories and perspectives. Because the research is both ongoing, and interest in bodily
issues spans several academic fields, such a list would be unmanageable. The book
Rhetorical Bodies is but one source that attempts to bring a representative collection of
analyses that deal with bodies in the field o f rhetoric. This book features over a dozen
essays that each link the study o f bodies and rhetoric in different ways. By tracing the
research o f these essays, the editors o f this book compile a list o f over 100 sources for a
selected bibliography to aid the discussion on material rhetoric alone. Clearly, an
exhaustive account o f such literature is unrealistic and unnecessary for this paper.
Further, the interest in body modification is also on the rise, with a growing pool
o f literature that was not included in this literature review. For example, in 1997 the
Theory, Culture, and Society Centre hosted a conference on body modification that
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featured papers on transsexualism, cyborgs, body building, and cosmetics. Also, a 1999
issue of Body & Society was dedicated solely to issues o f body modification. Essays in
this journal included topics on self-mutilation, tattooing, and modem primitivism. These
are just a few examples o f the growing academic interest in body modification. Though
these topics and issues are not discussed here, key players and concepts in this research
area will be featured within the chapters o f this pro ject.
In addition to a review o f recent scholarship on the body as it is understood to
exist within the field o f rhetoric, this project relies on some key methodological
assumptions that guide my analysis. The next section outlines and details these
assumptions.

Methodolouv

Taking my cue from Carole Blair, I will rely on the instances o f rhetoric
themselves to reveal the most appropriate method o f analysis. In other words, this
analysis is designed to include an “organic” approach to the application o f theoretical
perspectives to the study o f the selected textual objects and practices. However, as
suggested in the last section, I work from certain critical assumptions that will guide this
project in its discussion o f the body as rhetorical.
The first assumption is the notion o f what a “text” consists of, and how it is
discussed here. This project is based on the assumption that the term “text” can be
applied to objects and activities that extend beyond the literal written/spoken word.
According to Carole Blair, the domain o f rhetoric can be expanded to “include cultural
practices and artifacts beyond the spoken or written word” (“Reflections on Criticism and
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Bodies” 273). This approach extends the breadth o f rhetoric to include any cultural object
“including the full range o f media (visual, aural, and corporeal), ritual spectacles and
social activities ... commodities, and spaces” (Bennett, Grossberg, & Morris 346).
Understanding o f a text as such allows for the consideration o f human bodies and their
practices as rhetorical and cultural instances appropriate for critical analysis.
In “Text, Context, and the Fragmentation o f Contemporary Culture,” Michael
Calvin McGee posits that the fragmentation o f contemporary culture has resulted in a
shift in responsibilities for critics, from the interpretation o f a text to text construction
from a larger, uncompleted discourse. In this understanding, there are no concrete, static,
unified, and completed texts; instead there are only textual fragments that are
“assembled” by critics and situated for analysis. Though the fragmentation thesis allows
for the isolation o f incomplete fragments for analysis, McGee’s perspective suspends the
idea o f the object, arguing that “there are as many nuances o f rhetorical experience as
there are points in a line” (“A M aterialist’s Conception o f Rhetoric” 30-31), establishing
a model o f rhetorical effectivity that is virtually unlimited.
However, for the purposes o f this project, incorporation o f a more grounded
method o f analysis is needed to allow for the study o f the body as it is understood to
function in contemporary society. To achieve an adequate picture o f how the body is
culturally conceptualized, the “texts” featured in this study were chosen for the potential
representative relationship between the style and content o f the text to the material
practices it represents. This relationship, termed iconicity by Michael Leff and Andrew
Sachs, is the principle o f form enacting meaning, or o f the “imitative relationship”
between a sign and what it represents. Iconicity posits that “discursive form often enacts
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representational content” (Leff and Sachs 258). According to Leff and Sachs, “form and
meaning [of a text] are imbricated at every level ... to produce a structure o f meaning”
(pp. 268-269). This approaeh envisions specific, self-contained rhetorical instances as
they “blend form and meaning into local unities that ‘textualize’ the public world and
invite audiences to experience that world as the text represents it” (270). This principle
allows for the discussion o f the texts chosen for analysis in this project as representative
o f the material practices they depict as they occur and are understood in society.
However, this approach flirts with reductionism as it suggests that the essence o f a larger
cultural context is condensed within an isolated fragment.
In other words, since the world is ever changing and the dynamics o f effectivity
are ongoing and multidirectional, I cannot assume that a cultural object, whether it is
considered as a textual fragment or a complete text, is iconically representative o f the
reality from which it is extracted. Because o f this, my project attempts to meld the two
approaches o f McGee and Leff. Since a studied text has at once the potential to be
exemplary o f a larger cultural discourse and/or to become something entirely different,
this project oscillates between perspectives that look at representative texts (Left) and
unfinished textual fragments that exist within a larger cultural discourse (McGee).
Following the lead o f McGee, this project rejects the conceptualization o f text as a
“finished discourse anticipated in consequence o f an essentially homogenous culture” and
assumes that “changing cultural conditions have made it virtually impossible to construct
a whole and harmonious text” (287). However, by adopting the principle o f iconicity as
forwarded by Leff and Sach, this project assumes that fragments o f a larger, unfinished
text can be envisioned as iconic, and thus contain important dimensions o f the larger
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discourse within the analyzed object. In other words, though text and context are not
assumed to be one and the same, this project considers the cultural object (or process in
this case) as an artifact that simultaneously determines and is determined by the reality in
which it exists.
This conceptualization allows for the consideration of the body as a dynamic
medium o f constantly changing movements, practices, and significations. The human
body is understood to be an incomplete text, an ongoing process o f identity construction
and meaning-making that exists in an “intertextual” relation with a multiplicity o f other
objects, mediums, and cultural practices. Practices o f body modification, then, are
considered as they exist within a larger cultural context, and can thus be understood as
“fragments” o f the textual process o f the body as it exists within contemporary discourse.
These “fragments,” or rhetorical instances, though not considered to be wholly
emblematic o f this discourse, are understood to relate to a larger cultural “whole.”
Related to effectivity and intertextuality, this project approaches critical analysis
using a logic o f articulation, rather than a logic o f influence. Articulation is used here as it
refers to arrangement and historical emergence, a linking together o f elements in the
creation o f order and meaning. Nathan Stormer discusses articulation as
“transformational and emergent, creating new possibilities through the mutual interaction
o f elements where none existed before, augmenting by factors rather than by linear
accretion, or diminishing possibilities in ways that defy rudimentary calculation” (264).
Articulation, then, is the process by which discursive elements historically emerge in new
arrangements o f meaning and practice. In her essay “Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation
from Within the Thematie of Differance,’’" Barbara Biesecker challenges the traditional
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presumption o f direct causality, and calls for a rethinking o f the rhetorical situation “on a
trajectory o f becoming rather than Being” (127). This approach posits that, instead o f
being characterized by causality, rhetorical events should be defined by their
indeterminate possibilities. In other words, Biesecker envisions the rhetorical situation as
a set o f artieulations that contain the possibility o f new thoughts, expressions, and
behaviors.
When assuming a logic o f articulation, a rhetorical text is understood as existing
within ongoing networks o f effectivity. This perspective understands the material
practices o f body modification as producing and being produced by material effects
within an “unequally and unstably organized field o f tendential forces and struggles”
(Grossberg, “Wandering Audiences, Nomadic Critics” 383). Building on this, Greene’s
discussion o f a logic o f articulation in materialist rhetoric focuses on “how rhetorical
practices create the conditions o f possibility” (22). In adopting a logic o f articulation in
my critical analysis, this project does not assume a direct causal influence between media
texts and the body, but instead views both as sites o f articulation between the interaction
and intersection of material effects. The task, then, becomes locating the rhetorical
instance and determining how it functions in relation to other instances and to larger
structures o f power.
Finally, this project is framed through a philosophy of materialism that is based
on the assumption that cultural practices shape and are shaped by their social and political
realities, thus linking materiality with subjectivity. The two principles, however, are
assumed to be mutually supportive and co-constitutive. This project embraces a view of
materiality that “addresses the world o f people in social, cultural, political, technological.
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and economic relations; it talks about people with ideas, desires, pleasures, and emotions,
all o f which are defined by the forms and organizations o f practices that are available to
transform these dimensions o f reality” (Grossberg, as cited in Blair 289). 1 want to
examine the ways that subjectivity and materiality are mutually constitutive. This paper is
based on the assumption that individual “agency is communal, social, cooperative, and
participatory and, simultaneously, constituted and constrained by the material and
symbolic elements o f context and culture” (Campbell, “Agency: Promiscuous and
Protean” 3). In other words, I view materiality and subjectivity as playing equal roles in
the constitution and constraint o f agency. In this conceptualization, while an individual is
subjectified to exist and understand the world in a certain way, his/her material practices
have the equal capacity to effectively shape our social realities, and thus subjectivity. We
are, in short, both the subjects and the authors o f our histories.
The physical body and practices o f the subject, then, are constrained by
ideological processes o f subjectification, but as the individual performs his/her
subjectivity new resources become available for future articulations, thus influencing the
larger cultural discourse. Though subjects do not exist in a history o f their own making,
their material practices are inventive in the sense that they create material effects that
allow for new possibilities for future meaning-making activities. This is how I approach
the problem o f agency and invention. Greene discusses the rhetorical canon o f invention
as it “points to how different rhetorical practices make visible a host o f behaviors and
populations” (31) that make social change possible. Consideration o f body modification
as material practice can thus be considered inventive as it exists within networks o f
effectivity. As each practice engenders a multiplicity o f effects, body modification can be
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envisioned as a rhetorical instance— rather than a “situation”— that negotiates, constructs,
and disseminates meanings that have the potential to alter future realities.

Thesis Organization

The following represents the organization and preliminary table o f contents for
this project.
Chapter 2
This chapter argues that the body discursively is constrained by a cultural
commitment to interiority. Interiority describes the rhetorical scene o f self-hood. It refers
to a set o f culturally shared beliefs about the authentic inner-self: one’s soul, stable being,
or “true identity.” It specifies, in other words, an essential belief in one’s authentic inner
being, whether spiritual, romantic, or social. Leading the discussion o f how people
articulate practices o f body modification based on assumptions about interiority will be a
discussion o f the movie Modify. This is an award winning documentary about varying
practices o f body modification ranging from the socially acceptable to the socially
extreme. The directors o f this movie travel the country asking these modifiers “why?”
This film provides, in the modifiers’ own words, subjective answers, illuminating that
many of the practices in this film rely heavily on the assumption that human bodies are a
physical manifestation o f some sort o f essential inner-being.
Chapter 3
The third chapter argues that the body is believed to relate directly to social
acceptability as a result o f the assumptions in chapter two. This chapter discusses an
understanding o f the body as it is used as a vehicle o f socialization and acceptance in the
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ongoing quest for a rhetorically constructed ideal o f beauty, success, and worldly
happiness. Organizing this discussion will be the personal narrative o f Cindy Jackson, the
woman who has set the world record for having had the most plastic surgeries o f anyone
in the world. After undergoing a reconstruction o f her entire form, Jackson moved on to
write books about her choices, practices, and experiences. Revealed in her memoirs is a
desire to be socially accepted and valued. Her subjective desires and motivations to
change her physical form are fueled by an ideology that holds and values the human body
in a certain way. However, because o f her extreme “commitment” to achieving the goal
o f social acceptance, she has inadvertently set herself apart from what is viewed as
socially acceptable, though her body mirrors her interpretation o f the ideal female form.
Chapter 4
The fourth chapter argues that the assumptions outlined in chapters three and four
can be used to manipulate the body for political effect. This chapter follows attempts o f
individuals who manipulate their physical condition as the expression o f their political
beliefs and desires. Leading this analysis is an examination o f Morgan Spurlock’s awardwinning documentary “Super-Size Me.” In this text, Spurlock transforms his once
healthy, trim body into a spectacle o f obesity in order to provoke political and social
reform. His conscious intent in this film is to exhibit his body as a protest to corporate
fast food culture and to make a statement on the epidemic o f obesity. After only 30 days,
Spurlock had completed his “experiment” and had the materials, including the image of
his grotesquely changed physical being, to make his statement. However, in this time, he
had also caused irreversible damage to his body. Because o f his intent, however, his
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practice is not framed as self-mutilation, but instead a noble quest with social utility in
mind.
Chapter 5
This final section summarizes and synthesizes the conclusions found in each
individual chapter. Additionally, this chapter addresses the contributions this project
makes to the rhetorical investigation o f the body and bodily practices. I detail the
usefulness o f the assumptions outlined in these chapters, as well as make
recommendations for their reconsideration.
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Notes

' The Am erican Society o f P lastic Surgeons. A ccessed on 13 August 2006 www.plasticsurgerv.org
^ “Intent” is an inherently problematic term in rhetorical studies, and is used here to the extent that w e have
an awareness o f our own choices and actions. A further discussion o f ideology and agency as it is
understood in the scope o f this project is featured in the m ethodology portion o f this paper.
D iscipline an d Punish, The H istory ofSexuality, an d P ow er/K now ledge are just a few works o f Michel
Foucault that discuss the body in relation to power.
^ Adaptations o f a number o f these questions appear in the Rationale portion o f this chapter.
^ 1 explain M cG ee’s fragmentation thesis in the m ethodology section o f this chapter.
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NO BODY KNOWS THE REAL ME:
INTERIORIZING THE BODY
I approach the topic o f body modification with the assumption that all body
projects have the potential to be rich with both individual and social meaning. However,
because o f the nature o f this potential, I argue that body modification projects have no
inherent significance, and only become meaningful as they occur in specific personal and
cultural contexts. 1 will demonstrate that body modification projects exist on several
levels o f rhetoricity (personal, social, cultural, etc.), making the body a site o f conflict
and struggle over intended and perceived meaning. There is no fixed denotative meaning
to any act o f body modification; rather, the way in which these practices are understood
to function both on an individual and on a social level depends on specific contexts that
are comprised o f personal feelings, individual experiences, and fundamental cultural
assumptions about the self and the body.
In this chapter 1 focus on different ways in which people consciously manipulate
their bodies in order to express a sense o f internal “selfhood.” Throughout the course o f
this chapter, I will illuminate the ways in which bodies are rhetorically constructed
through an assumption about the fundamental link between notions o f the inner and outer
self. The aim o f this chapter is two-fold: First, I will examine how the human body has
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been culturally upheld as a publication device used to transmit feelings o f internal
selfhood and essential identity. In so doing, I will illustrate how cultural understandings
o f the body are rhetorically produced and reproduced and, in turn, contextualize human
bodies and limit their signification. In order to accomplish this, I will combine several
“texts” to be observed and analyzed. First, 1 will include the testimony o f body modifiers
as they are presented in Modify, a 2005 documentary that follows various practices o f
body modification. Additional statements were collected via e-mail exchanges with
several individuals discussing the desires and intentions behind their modification
practices. The voices o f these modifiers provide a vivid depiction o f the role that
assumptions about the inner-self and identity play in these practices. In so doing, I hope
to illustrate the general cultural tendency to link body modification to feelings o f “true
selfliood,” and provide a nuanced way to understand body modification projects.
Ultimately, 1 will argue that practices o f body modification must be disarticulated from
their dominant meanings in order to “free up” their potential to be meaningful and
productive in new ways. The goal here is not to make moral judgments about these
practices, but rather to de-essentialize the significations o f body projects. The unveiling
o f the body and its modification as rhetorical productions contributes to the overarching
argument of this project that such practices can become rhetorically inventive only when
their underlying cultural assumptions are exposed and re-evaluated.

Who am I? Questions o f the Authentic Self and the Bodv

As the human body is commonly understood to be a site and vehicle of personal
expression, it has become natural to link the physical form with “interior” feelings o f
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subjective being. “I didn’t feel like everyone else,” a young man who goes by “Johnny
Angry Johnny” explained via e-mail, “So I began to find ways to change the way I
looked and make it visually apparent that I w asn’t the same as everyone else. Now I feel
more like m yself than I ever did before.” ' “Johnny Angry Johnny” is only one body
modifier, but his words are indicative o f a cultural epidemic. Millions o f people today
have expressed a similar interest in communicating a sense o f self to the world through
their bodies. Because o f the cultural tendency to link the exterior to the interior, body
modification projects are often understood to be the physical expression and/or
representation o f one’s “true” subjectivity or “core” self. This perspective assumes that
selfness exists prior to corporeality. This notion not only influences how body texts are
read within the social, but also encourages personal body projects that perpetuate a
cultural understanding o f the body as such. The meanings attached to practices o f body
modification are culturally bound by fundamental assumptions and presuppositions
regarding the corporeal form and notions o f the “authentic self.” Until these assumptions
have been acknowledged, evaluated, and ultimately, deconstructed, the intended and
potential significations of body modification projects are discursively limited by these
cultural “knowledges.” Once these “truths” are acknowledged as cultural fictions, and the
extent to which bodies are rhetorically produced is fully realized, the practices that
consciously aim to alter the physical form can be freed to take on individual, unique, and
truly inventive meaning.
As explained by Drema Albin, “whether inscribed, pushed through, or bound, our
skins are used as textual boundaries that are reacted to by viewers” (Albin 20). Personally
and socially, body projects are treated as textual expressions or representations of
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subjectivity. The methods through which we physically “express” our subjectivity,
however, are shaped by both internal and external forces. According to Albin,
“modifications o f the body appear to incorporate at an individual level internal processes
and choices influenced by cultural representations” (20). The body as a dynamic text,
then, is subject to (mis)interpretation, contestation, and negotiation as it exists within a
larger rhetorical environment. As I will argue, the intentions o f personal body projects are
fueled by both visible and invisible cultural forces that both shape and constrain the
potential significations o f body modification practices.
According to Russ Castronovo, the American public is fixated on the immaterial.
In his book Necro Citizenship: Death, Eroticism, and the Public Sphere in the
Nineteenth-Century United States, Castronovo argues that the nation’s preoccupation
with issues o f the soul and interiority distract the public from the material conditions of
social and political existence, casting our gaze “inward” to constitute ideal models o f
citizenship and democracy. “Interiority” in this sense is the rhetorical scene o f self-hood.
It refers to a set o f culturally shared beliefs about the authentic inner-self: one’s soul,
stable being, or “true identity.” It specifies, in other words, an essential belief in one’s
authentic inner being, whether spiritual, romantic, or social. It is thought to be composed
o f “feelings, fantasy, desire, and affect” that can only be “reached through the mediation
o f language and representation” {Early American Literature pp. 1-2). Interiority, then, is
only accessible to others as it is featured in our strategic use o f language and other
symbols.
Castronovo’s general claim is that the American public understands “who we
essentially are” to be completely separate from our historically produced bodies, as well
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as the historical conditions that surround us. In his discussion o f occult rhetoric,
Castronovo demonstrates the hegemonic functions that physical bodies can have in
perpetuating a model o f citizenship that is pristine, passive, and unconflicted. It is
through an articulation with the body and “soul” that historically untouched bodies
function in this manner, presenting the unmarked and ahistorical body as the optimal
model. Castronovo argues that the “little girl” was the ideal model o f citizenship in the
1830’s because her body had not yet been marred by her surrounding materiality, thus
privileging the immaterial over the material and presenting an unobtainable model as
ideal. This same privileging can be seen in contemporary society, as Berlant argues that
the “little girl” is central in structuring “adult culture.” She claims that “legitimate US
citizenship” is structured around the “psychological and political vulnerability” (“Live
Sex Acts” 279) that the little girl figure is said to represent. This, in turn, results in the
fixation on the figurative little girl’s “morals, mind, acts, body, and identity” (Berlant
286) in the structuring o f social and political logics. The use o f immaterial bodies as a
model, however, is problematic because bodies are “historical rather than biological or
purely physical” (McKerrow, “Corporeality and Cultural Rhetoric” 3 18). Human bodies
inevitably are shaped and marked by material conditions, such as natural wear and tear
throughout time, physical labor, race, gender, and illness.
However, although citizenship, or what Castronovo would call the cultural fiction
o f legitimate citizenship, privileges issues o f the “soul” over the body, it has become a
common association in society to understand the two to be inextricably linked. Though
the “soul” is understood to have priority over, and even independence from the physical
body, the human form has come to be understood as a medium through which the
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intangible “authentic s e lf’ can become socially accessible. This can be seen in the
express intentions o f body modifiers. For example, Steve Haworth, recognized as the
father o f 3D body art, states: “Some people want to express their soul to the world around
them. One o f the ways they can do that is body modification.” Haworth, a certified tattoo
artist who is practiced in the “art” o f subdermal implementation, makes this assessment
based on his interaction with several clients a day that seek his expertise.^ Haworth
clearly subscribes to the notion that the body and the soul are directly linked to one
another. Further, because o f the common understanding o f body modification as an
expression o f “selfness” amongst his clientele, he recognizes this claim as a justifiable
and reasonable motivation to participate in such acts. Because o f the tendency to assume
an automatic relationship between the body and the soul, the American public has
become obsessed with issues o f the body as the physical manifestation o f selfhood. The
material becomes an echo of the immaterial, the physical becomes a pathway to the
metaphysical, and hence the body matters to the extent it relates to the soul.
Magrit Shildrick argues that the question that plagues the Western imagination is
that o f “Who am 1?” She claims the conventional answer to that question refers to a sense
o f self that assumes “a transcendent detachment from the material business o f the world,
or at least an effective, and indeed affective, autonomy within it” (79). The American
fantasy is one o f transcendent autonomy over the physical self, fueling the need to feel
unique and individual within and ultimately through our bodies. This fantasy is what
drives the American public to articulate acts o f body modification with expressions of
individuality. Though we consider ourselves to be unique and distinct from the “mere”
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materiality o f the world, we desire to be recognized as individuals and for the flesh
boundaries o f our “core” self to reflect our affective understanding o f who we are.
The performance and pursuit o f this American fantasy are clearly demonstrated in
the documentary film, Modify. The film hosts interviews with people who participate in a
wide variety o f body modification practices, ranging from the conventional to those
normatively considered to be “extreme.” In this film, the directors o f Modify, Greg
Jacobson and Jason Gary, travel the country and ask these modifiers, simply, “why?”
Why do they participate in such practices? What are their aims? This film provides the
modifiers’ own words in response to these questions. One respondent, a tattoo artist
named “Bear,” proudly answers the question o f “why” with; “Everyone modifies their
body in one form or another to help show on the outside how they feel on the inside.”
The subjects in this film thus largely confirm the cultural tendency to project feelings of
interiority onto their physical bodies. This film illuminates the point that many o f the
body modification practices featured rely heavily on the assumption that human bodies
are a physical manifestation or representation o f some sort o f inner-being. The
significations o f these acts, then, are limited insofar as they are presumed to be directly
related to issues o f the “soul” or essential self.
Shildrick further argues that “selfhood” can be addressed in one o f two ways.
First, the corporeal form can be “bracketed out, as though it were o f no concern” (78). In
this line o f thought, the body and the mind bear no necessary relation to one another, and
the self exists solely in the immaterial realm. This perspective clearly privileges feelings
o f interiority, as worldliness does not seem to bear any significance in the becoming o f
subjectivity. This worldview seems to maintain that “who we are” has nothing to do with

35

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

either our material conditions or our physical bodies. We exist prior to our experiences,
outside o f history.
The other approach sees subjectivity as being “inseparable from material beingin-the-world” (78). This point o f view envisions subjectivity as being comprised o f both
body and soul, allowing the material to bear some level o f importance in the composition
o f selfhood. This perspective, however, still assigns the material a secondary role in the
construction and shaping o f the self. Shildrick argues that “to be a self is above all to be
distinguished from the other, to be ordered and discrete, secure within the well-defined
boundaries o f the body rather than actually being the body” (79). This common
understanding o f selthood as it relates to the body implies that there is an autonomous
inner being that is enclosed and protected from the material world by the corporeal from.
Clearly, though the body is thought o f as being cooperative with the core “essence” o f the
self, it continues to be considered as an instrument o f the self, rather than a constituent
part.
Because it posits a mind/body dualism, this conceptualization envisions the “se lf’
and the body as separate entities. However, though it is often considered that the interior,
“true” self exists on a separate plane o f existence from our material bodies, the common
assumption is that the two bear an important relationship to one another. This widespread
belief understands the human body to function as a buffer between the interiorized self
and the material world, assuming a dialectic relationship between corporeality and
interiority. This assumption is problematic because it presumes that all body modification
projects are inextricably linked with issues o f selfhood and identity. This, however, is
clearly not the case. Jen Davis, a professional tattoo artist, demonstrates this point. After
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adorning her body with six tattoos and dedicating her life to the profession, she proclaims
that she is done with tattooing simply because, as she states in the film, “it hurts.”
Further, she argues that the incessant question o f what her tattoos means is vexing
because “it doesn’t even always have to mean anything. It doesn’t always have to have
meaning behind i t ... sometimes people just think something is pretty.” Clearly, though
Davis holds this viewpoint, the continual querying into the significance o f her body art by
spectators illustrates a pervasive assumption about the potential meanings o f body
modification practices.
Now that we have discussed the fundamental assumptions surrounding issues of
the body and the soul and how they are presumed to relate to one another, we can move
on to investigate how this assumption fuels practices o f body modification as projects of
selfhood.

Bodv Modification as Projects o f the “Core” Self

The same practice o f body modification can be articulated in any number o f ways
that assume a connection between the essential inner-being and corporeality. According
to Pitts, “human bodies are always shaped and transformed through cultural practices”
and “body modifications have been interpreted as challenges to the naturalized status of
Western body norms, and as forms o f self-fashioning and self-narration in postmodern
culture” {In the Flesh 23). For example, in the movie Modify. Jesse Jarrell argues that
his choice to participate in new and innovative body modification practices started with
his discontentment with the human body. He argues that the human form is unsatisfactory
and seems as if it is “not finished.” His response was to be the creator o f a new form of
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body modification. Jarrell is recognized as the inventor of the first “soft” subdermal
implants, and wears rows o f them over each o f his biceps.
Other forms o f body modification practices can be linked to “unconventional
sexuality and gender” (Pitts 24). For example, one o f the prominent body modifiers
featured in Modify is Las Vegas’ Frank Marino, the leading act at the Riviera’s “An
Evening at La Cage.” Marino is a transvestite and has been working for over 20 years as
a Joan Rivers impersonator. Marino admits that he has undergone several plastic surgery
operations to make him self look younger and more feminine. His drive to alter his
physical appearance is rooted in his understanding o f how the self relates to the body, as
well as his knowledge o f social roles and gender conventions. However, though a display
o f unconventionalized gender and identity, his actions are actually subscribing to
normative understandings o f beauty and gender. His self-identification as a woman has
driven him to alter his physical form to mimic his perceived interiority.
Paul Sweetman discusses permanent body modification techniques as an attempt
to fix and anchor the “self.” Sweetman’s research indicated that individuals tend to use
body projects to demonstrate a strong “commitment to oneself’ (“Anchoring the
(Postmodern) Self?” 53). Sweetman claims to see an abundant tendency for individuals to
conceptualize their practices as “an attempt to lend corporeal solidarity to expressions o f
individuality” (53), further linking these practices with interiority. For example, Zulu, a
professional body piercer, discusses the importance o f his work and his own personal
modifications in Modify. Zulu states: “I wouldn’t feel complete. 1 wouldn’t even feel like
me. I wouldn’t feel human if I didn’t have this tattoo on my face.” Zulu’s statement
illustrates an intense perceived connection between his “true” inner-identity and his faeial

38

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

tattooing. Further, he feels that his identity was fragmented and partial until his
modifications perceivably completed him.
Belief in an “inner-essence” combined with a desire to be socially identified with
that essence results in the individual’s strategic manipulation o f verbal and visual
symbols to transmit that wholly private experience to the public. Interiority can be
thought o f as being concealed exclusively in the private realm because notions o f the
“inner-self’ are conceptualized as intangible to others and as “unique” to the individual.
A subject’s understanding o f his/her true identity, then, is best described as what Albin
calls a “translinguistic movement that is experienced” (23) and has “preverbal elements
that accompany affect, and thus need expression” (22). In other words, interiority is
experienced and, thus, requires modes other than the spoken word to make that
experience tangible. One must use several discursive and non-discursive forms to
transmit this intangible “movement.” This movement is best understood through Debra
Hawhee’s discussion o f “how bodies and language come together” (“Language as
Sensuous Action” 333). According to Hawhee, often overlooked is the fact that physical
gesture as communication precedes the spoken word. More, her assessment o f Sir
Richard Paget’s gesture-speech theory encourages a worldview that “turns on its head the
relatively recent commonplace o f ‘the body as discursive formation,’ offering instead
discourse as bodily formation” (332). As previously discussed, interiority is assumed to
exist in a state prior to the formation o f language. If Hawhee’s approach is accepted, then
it is assumed that all linguistic forms o f expression are accompanied by some originating
form o f bodily gesture, and that some expressions may be made without any verbal
expression at all. If this is the case, a linguistic mode o f expression is necessarily
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accompanied by a physical mode o f expression in the communication o f an affective
state. Cultural practices that articulate the body with interiority, then, utilize several
modes o f “self-expression” to communicate a unique sense o f self to others.
These methods o f self-expression can be understood as a publication o f interiority
that rely on an individual’s conscious behaviors and/or manipulation o f linguistic and
visual symbols. The proposal that these behaviors are “conscious” and intended plays an
important role in the material publication o f interiority. The claim o f conscious intent is
inherently problematic, since who we are and how we behave is the product external and
internal conditions frequently not o f our own making, and that many o f these conditions
are not or cannot be known to the subject. For example, some theorizations on how “the
self” is constructed and shaped posit that “invisible forces such as unconscious desire”
(Pitts 28) play an important role in the creation and maintenance o f the self. In this mind
set, individuals cannot have complete control over the shaping o f their subjectivity, and
thus do not have power over who they essentially “are.” This approach renders subjects
“zombies,” as Joshua Gunn and Shaun Treat would put it, that are oriented as social
subjects by ideology that “animates bodies and robs them o f agency” (“Zombie Trouble”
160). The formation o f their being is out o f their hands, and the complexity o f the self is
beyond the grasp o f the human consciousness. However, the social expression o f who
one truly thinks he or she “is” requires a conscious understanding o f an inner-essence and
the desire to actively represent that self through verbal and visual symbols and through
material practice. A publication o f interiority, whether through visual or verbal
representation (or both), requires 1) intention/desire to bring the “interior” to the
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“exterior”, 2) an understanding o f an interior state, and 3) the understanding and use o f
various symbol systems.
It is important to remember that our realities are mediated through symbols, signs
and codes. Whether or not one believes an objective, unmediated reality actually exists,
an individual’s access to it is virtually impossible. There is a natural propensity to forget
or ignore the great extent to which our personal and social realities are constructed and
understood through symbol use. Kenneth Burke argues that “though man is typically the
symbol-using animal, he clings to a kind o f naive verbal realism that refuses to realize the
full extent of the role played by symbolicity in his notions of reality [.vie]” (Language as
Symbolic Action 5). Further, he posits that humans can only experience a “tiny sliver o f
reality” and the rest of what we know is “a construct o f our symbol systems” (5). French
psychoanalyst .lacques Lacan would agree, as his theory o f psychic structure posits that
“The Real” is the world as it exists prior to mediation by language, the ego, and the other.
Lacan claims that though “The Real” exists, we cannot fully grasp or engage it because o f
our reliance on symbols and mediated forms. If this is taken to be true, then both our
understandings of ourselves and our material surroundings are rhetorically produced,
maintained, and modified. How we understand our realities is filtered through a rhetorical
lens that is mediated by language, context, and culture. The things we understand to be
“true” are rhetorical effects, and that which we consider to be “real” is always mediated
by discourse and culture. Albin concurs as he states that “a view o f reality may in fact be
a based on ideology that is mediated by media and culture [s/c]” (22). The urge to express
ourselves through our bodies, then, is a product o f how the body is prefigured
discursively and culturally. In turn, the ways in which our bodies are used to express
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ourselves (the methods o f interior publication) are determined by (and limited by) our
understanding o f the uses and functions o f our physical form. Finally, textual readings of
other bodies occur within a context— a rhetorical environment that is at once restrictive
and ever-changing.
Clearly, the cultural assumptions that link the body to a transcendent self help to
shape the ways in which we understand the human body and how it should function. This
premise leads to acts o f body modification that are understood to function as publication
devices that transmit subjective feelings o f selfhood so that they are accessible to others.
Nikki Sullivan agrees when she argues that the body is “one that ‘does T or performs its
identity in and through relations with others, and that both marks and is marked— ad
infinitum— in and through these affective dramatizations o f (inter)subjectivity and
(inter)textuality” (Tattooed Bodies 8). She explains that the body is a “map” that
reproduces interiority, but also performs connections and disconnections with other
textual bodies. This understanding, however, places the body in limbo— a wavering zone
o f private publicity, or public privacy. The body, in this sense, is a buffer, a boundary,
more specifically, a bridge between the realms o f privacy and publicity, immaterial and
material. It is thought o f as fully belonging to neither realm, but as existing in relation to
both.
As previously mentioned, visions o f the transcendent inner-self contribute to
theories that subscribe to a mind/body dualism that privilege the mind (soul) over the
body. In this view, the “s e lf’ exists separate from, or more precisely prior to, its physical
form, and issues o f the mind are viewed to be superior to issues o f the body. Rhetorical
theorist Raymie McKerrow notes that people assume their subjectivity exists prior to

42

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

their corporeality; he posits further that this is a “misrecognition” and that people have a
tendency o f “forgetting or repressing their own corporeal genealogies and processes o f
production” (318). However, because o f the social value placed on issues o f the soul, the
“se lf’ must act upon the body to exhibit its essence to others. Anxiety over
misrepresenting interiority fuels body modification practices that assume a connection
between the body and interiority. For example, when asked why he began participating in
modification acts such as body piercing, tattooing, scarification, and branding, one
individual responded; “I wanted something that showed who I was and that I’ve never
seen anybody have.”^ This statement reveals this young man’s drive to demonstrate his
feelings o f interiority and independence through body modification practices. His
understanding o f his “true” identity is that it exists separate from and prior to his material
being, and thus his acts o f body modification bridge his affective feelings o f subjectivity
with the material world. Without these actions, he assumes that his true essence will be
lost and remain undetected.
Clearly, the corporeal form is positioned as a site for “establishing identity that is
read by the self and others” and as “an ever-emerging, unfinished materiality that gains
meaning through various forms o f symbolie representation and material practice” (Pitts,
In the Flesh 29). The body, then, is treated as an ongoing project o f “becoming.” The
subject continually manipulates and transforms his/her physical shape as an attempt to
stylistically construct, maintain, or alter a perceived but fragmented and fluid identity.
For example, a body modifier may get a tattoo as a “rite o f passage” ritual, indicating to
that individual a self that is autonomous, independent, and self-sufficient. Though rites o f
passage are, by definition, social practices, they are culturally ingrained as symbolically
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transformative rituals indicating some fundamental growth or progression o f the
individual’s internal self. For example, in the United States, one must be 18 years o f age
in order legally to obtain a tattoo or piercing without a parent or a guardian’s consent.
This age is socially (and legally) understood to be a marker from adolescence to
adulthood. Once an individual reaches this age, he or she enjoys the many privileges and
also becomes susceptible to the many responsibilities o f what the government considers
to be an autonomous and legitimate citizen. This is the age at which a young adult may
vote, sign up for the military, buy pornographic materials, buy diet pills, participate in
psychological and sociological experiments, and sign the educated consent for required
for most to obtain a tattoo, piercing, brand, etc. Many youths engage in these spectacular
forms o f body modification in order to physically signify a point o f transformation and
independence in their own self narratives. This physical transformation o f the body
alludes to an immaterial transformation o f the individual’s inner-self. The modifier,
society, and the state recognize this transition into adulthood as a transformation o f
maturity, independence, and awareness. These feelings o f autonomy are transposed to the
act o f modification, thus charging the body with symbolic meaning. It is in this way that
body modification can be viewed as symbolic action.
A more socially “extreme” case o f an individual modifying their physical form to
agree with an abstract feeling o f interiority is the story o f a man who goes by the name of
“Stalking Cat.” Dennis Avner, or Stalking Cat, has undergone extensive tattooing and
other body modification practices to alter his physical form to resemble that o f a tiger. In
a testimonial given in the movie Modify he states: “The modifications that I’m doing are
part o f a very old Huron tradition, and it’s getting me closer to where 1 want to be and
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getting me closer to my totem.” Stalking Cat has completely changed his physical body
to project what he feels is an essential part o f his Native American spirituality. Though it
may be hard at first to equate the total body transformation o f Avner with the practices of
partial body modifiers, it must be acknowledged that the same underlying principle o f
interiority applies. In Avner’s case, he feels he is a man who is making an affective
feeling “real” through his material transformation. He feels strong ties with his Huron
heritage, and even stronger ties with his totem animal. His practices o f modification are
attempts at making inner feelings o f identification, dedication, and selfness both express
and substantially real to him self and others.
Though Stalking Cat is a unique case, a more common form o f whole body
modification that is articulated with an inner, intangible notion o f self can also be seen in
the practices of transsexual or transgendered subjects. An individual o f the male sex who
self-identifies with the female gender undergoes several cosmetic and reconstructive
surgeries in order to have “his” physical form mirror that o f the socially accepted
depiction o f the female sex. He (she) undergoes this physical transformation to seek a
balance between his (her) understanding o f their inner-self and the socialized self that
another “reads.” The previously mentioned Frank Marino has not undergone the
extensive sexual reassignment surgery, but has gone great lengths to “feminize” himself.
Though he was bom with the anatomy o f the male sex, he identifies with the female
gender, and has since taken action to reflect this internal self-identification physically, as
well as behaviorally. In this view, the essential self is viewed as existing prior to the
physical body, which is used as an apparatus to be manipulated and utilized to represent
inner feelings o f identity, desire, or affectivity.
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Intentions o f such practices assume that body modification is either a reflection of
who an individual genuinely “is,” or a bridging o f the gap between materiality and
spirituality. Experts in mental health scrutinize this impulse, degrading physical
expression in the face o f “higher” levels o f self-expression. One psychologist states; “If
you have to resort to using your body to express things, you haven’t got much to draw
on” (as cited in Pitts, “Body Modification, Self-Mutilation, and Agency” 299). From this
perspective, the body is seen as a poor substitute for “true self-hood.” The material is
regarded as second-rate and inconsequential to one’s “true being.” Either way, the
express subjective desires o f many body modifiers and their critics refer back to
attachments to an authentic inner-self, and continue to make material practices o f body
modification subservient to the immaterial qualities o f the self.
It is this notion that makes the practices o f transgendered subjects and subjects
such as “Stalking Cat” fundamentally the same. Although I do not discount the clear
differences between cases such as Avner and Marino, the point that I am trying to make
here is that the two practices have more in common than the normative logic would be
able to admit. Both cases are examples o f the impulse to bring that which is interior to the
exterior. Both change the shape o f their material being to bring balance between their
corporeality and their feelings o f inner subjectivity. Most importantly, both assume that
verbal declaration o f identity falls short o f the communicative effects rendered by a
physical declaration o f selfness. It is as Albin states: “The subject knows but does not
know who he is for he cannot see this on his body” (31). These subjects are thus
compelled to make physical otherwise immaterial feelings o f selfness and affectivity.
Body modification as such is a project o f the self that aims to bring the interior to the
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exterior. Without the social presupposition that the shape and state o f the physical body is
somehow related to the quality and condition o f the mental or spiritual self, individuals
would not feel compelled to make such material proclamations o f selfness.
Clearly, body projects are personally and socially thought o f as projects o f the
“self.” The fundamental assumption that is responsible for the routine articulation o f the
body to interiority fuels practices o f body modification that attempt to bridge or seek
balance between a notion o f “selfness” and a physical being in the world. As body
modification projects are thought o f as practices that attempt to bring the interior state o f
an individual into tangible existence, these projects must be considered as they materially
occur within a cultural context.

Modification or Mutilation? The Rhetorical Categorization o f Bodv Projects

It cannot be denied that social power relations favor certain forms o f modification
while others are inevitably marginalized. Although some practices o f body modification
that were previously considered “extreme” have been conventionalized and adopted by
the mainstream society, many o f these practices have been stigmatized and are often
interpreted as forms o f “self-mutilation.” In the mental health use o f the term, selfmutilation describes “a corporeal expression o f a suffering se lf’ (Pitts, In the Flesh 25).
In other words, practices o f body modification that are not normatively accepted are
rejected as signs o f mental illness or self-destruction. Because o f assumptions linking
corporeality with interiority, the practice o f voluntarily inflicting pain on one’s self for
whatever articulated reason is normatively understood to be an expression o f disturbed
human depth— a crying out (conscious or not) o f a suffering or disabled inner-self. It is
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based on this assumption that acts o f body modification are tantamount to self-mutilation,
and that modified bodies are understood as an expression o f "an imperfect, out o f control
and suffering self which might need to be treated” (Pitts, “Body Modification, SelfMutilation and Agency” 295). Nikki Sullivan agrees as she argues that body marking is
generally read as a message o f harm that reveals the essence o f the individual self.
The concept o f self-mutilation, then, relies heavily on the articulation o f the
corporeal form to a separate but connected essential self. Without an understanding o f the
body that links the corporeal with immaterial subjectivity, the cultural category o f “selfmutilation” would not exist. Further, it must be acknowledged that practices that
constitute “self-mutilation” in one worldview can also be articulated as an expression of
autonomy, identification, or spirituality in another. Pitts argues that “body modifiers’
knowledge about body modification is not only affective, but expresses new, alternative
and recirculated attitudes toward technology, pleasure, sexuality, cultural membership,
gender, spirituality, aesthetics, and beauty” (293). For instance, certain practices o f
mortification are criticized and understood by some as indications o f pathological
disorders, while these same acts are embraced and understood to serve productive secular
or spiritual purposes by others. Mortification o f the flesh is understood religiously to be
reminiscent o f the suffering of Jesus, and is used by some religious subcultures to
strengthen faith or to overcome weakness. For example, members o f Opus Dei— an
organization within the Roman Catholic Church dedicated to the “universal call to
holiness” or, in other words, the belief that everyone should aspire to be a saint— partake
in what they term “corporeal mortification” which consists of acts such as self-denial or
self-flagellation to attest their spiritual devotion. Opus Dei founder Josemaria Escriva
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writes: “What has been lost through the flesh, the flesh should pay back: be generous in
your penance.”'^ Members o f this organization are encouraged to engage in various forms
o f corporeal mortification to self-punish and cleans themselves o f daily sins. These selfinflicted acts o f punishment serve as a reminder o f the suffering o f Jesus and
symbolically act as a rededication o f body and soul to Christ. Though these acts can
permanently scar or “disfigure” the practitioner’s body, because o f the meanings attached
to these actions, they are thought o f as being not only acceptable, but necessary within
the subculture. The same practice that would be (and is) considered to be “self
destructive” in one context has spiritual meaning in another.
Another example is the use o f mortification in sadomasochistic contexts.
Participants in the BDSM (Bondage Discipline Sadomasochism) subculture engage in
practices o f mortification in both sexual and non-sexual contexts to signify a subcultural
identity, to configure and represent power dynamics, and to enhance experiences o f
sexuality, desire, pleasure (as pain), and pain (as pleasure). As 1 have just demonstrated,
body modification acts that are normatively stigmatized as “self-mutilation” in
mainstream culture can be embraced and utilized by subcultural groups to serve different
purposes, provide distinctive pleasures, and thus assume new meanings. These
subcultural rearticulations, however, continue to assume that the physical manipulations
of the body are external indications o f a privileged internal self. Both religious and
secular acts o f mortification have been pathologized (made deviant and marginal) by the
mainstream culture, thus deeming certain material practices o f interiority unacceptable
and even dangerous according by normative standards.
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Pitts concurs as she states “body modifiers are depicted as more
psychopathological than other groups” (In the Flesh 25). According to Pitts, the social
framing of body modification as self-mutilation “makes the prospect o f agency dubious
or theoretically impossible” (“Body Modification, Self-Mutilation, and Agency” 296).
She argues that discourses equating body modification with mental illness have socially
problematized such practices and inevitably deny its subjects agency. This mind set holds
that attempts to fashion the physical form are not the choice o f the individual, but rather
“a desire, addiction, need, or urge” (296), suggesting that body modifiers are not agents,
but, instead, victims. Body modifiers themselves attempt to complicate this account,
arguing that body modification is a state o f complete agency. For example, women body
modifiers claim that their practices “redefine beauty” and are acts o f reclaiming their
bodies from patriarchal culture. The Suicide Girls, for example, are a subculture o f
alternatively styled soft-core pornographers who base their entire existence on this
platform. Their mission statement is “to change your idea about what makes women
beautiful,” thus challenging normative attitudes and values.^ Flowever, because o f the
methods used by the Suicide Girls to express beauty and selfness, their interests are
necessarily trumped by heteronormative culture. For example, traditional feminists
discredit the overlying message that the Suicide Girls claim to stand behind, arguing that
the women participating in the website are reaffirming normative power dynamics that
marginalize and objectify women. Pitts agrees as she states; “unofficial or marginalized
knowledges like these are already less likely to be ‘read’ in public discourse as
discernible or legitimate positions” (“Body Modification, Self-Mutilation, and Agency”
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299). Clearly, context, desire, manner o f publication, and effect play central roles in the
rhetorical categorization o f corporeal practices.
Because o f how body modification practices are culturally understood to
function— as a rhetorical transmission device that makes visible an individual’s most
private pleasures, desires, and interests— the human body can only be understood through
a grid o f intertextuality and intersubjectivity. According to Albin, no text exists alone,
and text can only be understood within a given cultural context and historical placement.
Albin continues: "Body modifications must be understood in the broader context o f
culture in addition to individual meanings” (Albin 24). Though a useful claim, this
perspective suggests that cultural context and the individual meanings that people give to
their practices are separate entities. Although eultural and individual meanings are not
neeessarily eongruent, it is inevitable that the personal meanings and interpretations of
texts will be influenced in one way or another by the material and historical conditions
surrounding both the reader and the text itself. It is just as McKerrow states: “bodies are
trapped inside cultures, and exhibit those acts promoted within the culture” (319).
Bodies as texts, then, exist only in relation to other bodies (as texts). These bodies
are upheld and understood socially through a fluid network o f power relations that favors
certain manners o f production, maintenance, and manipulation. Because o f their
intertextual nature, bodies and their modifieation necessarily exist within a cultural
context that understands what a body is and how it should function. The cultural context
in which we live upholds the body as a device through which our internal identity is able
to become socially recognized, “creating a culture o f individuals wearing their psyches
on their skin” (Albin 26). Clearly, then, because o f how our culture understands the body
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in relation to the self, modifications made to the body are socially read as personal
expressions o f one’s inner-being, even if this is not the express intent of the modifier
him/herself. Because o f this, subjects are encouraged to supplement their verbal
expressions o f identity with physical representations o f affective feelings and
experiences. However, because there is no structured, agreed upon way societies may
read the body, the social reading o f these corporeal texts rely on both personal and
culturally constituted associations and judgments. Relying on their own subjective
feelings and experiences, individuals read other bodies in the same way they understand
their own, as well as through the same ideological lens discursively constructed by their
cultural environment. This necessarily results in the possibility o f multiple readings and
interpretations o f the same practice o f body modification. Albin agrees as he argues that
practices o f body modification carry several levels o f meaning that “blur across the
boundaries both imposed by the self and society, resulting in distorted conveyance o f
meanings” (27). However, though distorted, these readings continue to be conditioned in
powerful ways by our commitment to an authentic self, as well as the understood
articulation o f this notion to our physical existence. We want our physical bodies to be
individual and unique and the modifications o f our bodies to be meaningful and
inventive, but until we can nuance and demystify the assumptions outlined in this
chapter, the potentiality o f such practices will be limited.

C onclusions

Not all body modification projects are created equal. I do not deny that there is
much dissimilarity amongst different methods o f body modification and the extent to
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which individuals participate in them. However, the same underlying assumptions and
goals fuel practices o f body modification, as well as fostering the social reading o f them.
Because o f the assumptions linking acts o f body modification to interiority, many
practices that should not be associated are likened to one another, while other
fundamentally similar practices are dissociated. On one hand, two different bodies
adorned with tattoos for very different reasons should not be read in the same way. One
instance may be an intended expression o f a perceived “core” self, while the other may be
a thoughtless result o f peer pressure. Though the practice o f tattooing is the same, the
meanings are not. On the other hand, such as in the case o f Avner and Marino, two
completely different sets o f practices— whole body tattooing and surgical alteration to
liken the body to the form o f a tiger, and a series o f plastic surgeries, make-up, costumes,
and wigs to liken the male form to that o f a female— serve the same fundamental
pui-pose. The practices are substantially different, but the driving force is the same need
to seek congruency between self-identification and physical form. The main claim 1 am
forwarding here, then, is that practices o f body modification bear no necessary relation to
a codified set o f meanings. The understanding o f the body as ongoing project o f selfhood
must be recognized as a cultural practice that is produced by and in turn reproduces its
own materiality. In this perspective, social categories, such as body modification, selfmutilation, and self-maintenance, are rhetorical designations. These designations enable
certain readings o f cultural practices, while thwarting others. In other words, by assuming
a priori that acts o f body modification are indefinitely linked to a “core” self or “true”
identity, we are limiting the potential meanings o f these practices. In order to provide a
nuanced way o f understanding the intended, perceived, and effectual significations o f
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body projects, we must first disarticulate the body from the privileges o f interiority, and
sever the assumed relation between meaning and practice.
The presupposed connection between the corporeal form and the intangible and
internal self is ideologically reaffirmed through our cultural practices. Body modification
projects can either be explicitly used by individuals to express who they “are” or are
socially read as expressions o f selfhood. Both cases automatically consider the human
body a tool used by the authentic self to project its essence, thus reaffirming the cultural
assumptions that there is an essential self, and that it necessarily acts itself out onto and
through the body. Both the methods we use and the articulations we make between
various practices o f body modification and our ideas about the authentic self are made
possible by previous articulations and understandings o f both the body and the self. The
inclination to relate body modification to the self, as well as the tendency to consciously
and intentionally manipulate the physical form to communicate our perceptions o f our
self and identity are products o f the rhetorical environments in which we live. The social
understanding and acceptance o f body projects is determined by how each instance is
rhetorically framed both by the individual and by its surrounding culture.
Clearly, though our cultural knowledge fosters the interpretation that the
corporeal form reflects the state o f our internal self, this understanding brings forth
several complicated and widely debated issues o f the methods, intentions, perceptions,
relativity, context, and effects o f body modification projects. Such body projects exist on
several levels of rhetoricity. The first level is a transparent one. The self-exercising
cultural assumption that links the body to interiority is often considered to be mere fact.
Many do not question this relationship because it is thought to be a cultural truth. But
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where did this articulation come from? Even amidst cultural arguments o f religion,
spirituality, and the soul, most cling to a belief that somewhere, deep inside our bodies,
lies the real us. Whether or not we believe this entity to be our soul, our spirit, or our
mind, we are attached to the idea that the answer to the “Who am 1?” question lies deep
within, but separate from, our physical bodies. This attachment to an autonomous self,
however, does not keep us from assuming that the body is (or should be) a physical
manifestation o f our “core” selves. As a direct result o f this assumption, subjects
consciously manipulate their bodies to reflect this sense o f “inner depth.” Because
matters o f interiority are expressly private, as the ways we understand and experience our
“essential s e lf’ belong only to our cognitive and affective states, the expression o f this
perceived internal state requires a strategic crafting and displaying o f both linguistic and
non-linguistic symbols. In other words, the publication o f interiority is the rhetorical
process o f making a wholly private individual public. Material practices used to transmit
an affective understanding o f selfhood makes accessible to others a previously concealed
personal experience of selfness.
Because individuals are conditioned to treat their bodies as ongoing projeets o f
interior subjectivity, the body is disregarded as a fragmented material mass that is used to
commemorate a personal narrative, capitalize aspects o f perceived identity, and
ultimately used to express who someone “is.” This approach views the body “as a
garment, a veil or mask, as something which should be changed and modified to become
congruent with the changes in the se lf’ (Featherstone 10). The fact that our bodies are
needed to sustain life, and are, at the very least, vehicles through which we are able to
actually have subjective experience is generally disregarded. The mere conception o f
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interiority suggests that materiality has no, or at least very little, bearing on issues o f the
self and identity. It is vital that we stop assuming that our bodily form is an automatic
screening o f our interior conditions. Though all o f the aforementioned acts can be
construed as acts of “publicity,” as all are intended or are read as making subjective
feelings of interiority available to be socially read and interpreted, if we recognize that
action and meaning share no inevitable connection, the assumed relation between the
body and the self melts away. The notion o f interiority automatically privileges the
immaterial, while assigning the human body a secondary role in the formation o f the self.
Once we stop likening our bodies to surface indicators o f a deeper and more “real”
subjectivity the body may be freed up to function in more inventive ways.
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Notes

' The statements provided in this chapter, as well as in subsequent chapters, are the result o f informal
correspondence via e-mail with several individuals who consider them selves to be “body modifiers.” These
individuals range from the socially “moderate” to the socially “extreme” in the manners in which they
consciously choose to alter their bodies. There were no lists o f questions prompting their responses, but
rather, 1 let the modifiers guide the conversation, discussing matters that they felt were central to their
choices to m odify their bodies. These conversations took place over several months between the dates o f
August 30, 2006 and February 23, 2007.
‘ According to BM EZine.com, subdermal implementation is the insertion o f three-dimensional objects
under the skin. An implant is “any object implanted fully under the skin for the purpose o f affecting a
sculptural change o f the surface.”

As cited on the Opus Dei Awareness website at www.odan.org/corDoreal modification.htm
^ As cited on the SuicideGirls website at w w w.suicidegirls.com
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CHAPTER THREE

MODIFYING SOCIETY: INTERIORITY
AND CORPOREAL SOCIALITY
On February 17, 2007, America’s pop music princess Britney Spears did the
unthinkable: She shaved her head bald and got two new tattoos on her once idolized
physique. These acts o f body modification attracted the attention o f broadcast and print
media, with reporters and fans immediately condemning her acts and speculating on the
reasons why she chose to change her look. While a few fans think the new look is a
provocative statement or hold the view that Britney Spears can do with her body what she
pleases, most speculate on her recent modifications as indications o f an identity crisis, a
nervous breakdown, drug addiction, and/or mental illness. For example, one ABC
headline reads “Shaving off Her Hair and Tattooing Her Body May Be Spears’ Way o f
Finding A Fresh Start,” ' while an article from CNN.com postulates that Britney’s recent
actions may be due to postpartum depression.^ This recent occurrence illustrates how
body modification is perceived in normative society. While some modifications, such as
the numerous hair extensions Spears has sported over the years, are welcomed and even
encouraged in the popular realm, others are rejected and/or scandalized in the critical eye
o f normative. Whether she shaved her head out o f protest to standardized gender norms,
as the result o f a mental breakdown, or merely out o f sheer boredom and attention
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seeking behavior, Britney Spears physically acted upon her body and the action is now
being “read” and reacted to by millions. The “event” is being reported by credible news
authorities and treated as legitimate headline news, and for one resounding reason: The
general populace is fascinated.
A similar headline in current news is the story o f a former Playboy Playmate’s
untimely demise. Anna Nicole Smith died suddenly at the age o f 39 on February 8, 2007.
Though the former Playmate is no stranger to obsessive news coverage, recent media
attention has been paying close attention to the testing and treatment o f her dead body.
Rewind back to 1991 and we will recall that Anna N icole’s original claim to fame was
her live body gracing the cover o f the March issue o f Playboy. Sixteen years later the
public is still obsessing over her body. The media frenzy surrounding Britney Spears’
recent body modifications and the posthumous treatment o f Anna N icole’s body are
prime cases o f normatively idolized bodies gone spectacularly wrong. Both are prominent
examples o f our cultural infatuation with bodies, the cultural pressures to normalize
bodies, and the social reaction to perceptively “un-natural” bodies. Further, the ways in
which the public reads these bodies and gives them meaning continue to rely on the
habitual articulation o f bodies with an internal sense o f self.
In chapter two 1 examined the body as a publication device used to transmit
feelings o f interiority. This chapter focuses on the body as it is used as a socialization
device in the s e lfs idealized quest for acceptance, desirability, normalcy, and perfection.
Organized by the routine articulation o f the body with interiority, use o f the human form
as a medium o f social commerce is based on the assumed relationship o f an individual’s
physical appearance and his or her character, competence, and social worth. These
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fundamental assumptions are joined by rhetorically constructed and upheld cultural ideals
o f physicality, sexuality, and selfness to create a culture driven by fantasies o f corporeal
sociability, or the body as a locus o f social value.
Throughout the course o f this chapter, 1 will investigate body modification
projects that are enacted in order to fulfill goals of sociality. In so doing, 1 will illuminate
how the assumptions bolstering the cultural understanding and use o f the body as a social
bartering tool are a rhetorical outgrowth o f the underlying assumptions articulated in
chapter one. First, 1 will examine the cultural ideals that organize, foster, and maintain
social networks and power relations, and thus, the role o f the self as it exists within a
particular cultural context. Then, 1 will illustrate how these contextualized ideals prompt
a sense of corporeality that strives to attain social adherence and acceptance. In other
words, how these rhetorically constructed fantasies frame the body as social capital. In
order to accomplish this, 1 combine observation and analysis o f several practices and
narratives o f body modifiers. Organizing the discussion are the personal narratives o f
public figures, such as “extreme makeover” cases Cindy Jackson and Miles Kendall, as
reported in interviews and memoirs outlining the choices, practices, and experiences that
have made them into the bodies they are today.
Jackson has set the record for having the most plastic surgeries o f anyone in the
world in her quest to attain her ideal Barbie-like form. Following Jackson’s lead, Kendall
is recognized as the first male to undergo an “extreme makeover” through plastic surgery.
These highly visible cases are supplemented with statements collected via personal email exchanges with several body modifiers expressing the desires and intentions behind
their practices. Together, the voices included in this analysis indicate a cultural economy
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where the human body as a commodity that transmits social value and can be
manipulated to achieve desired social aims. As a collective, their statements demonstrate
the cultural assumptions about corporeal sociality discussed in this chapter, as well as
illustrate the central role the body has assumed in the carrying out o f social hierarchies.
In short, the aim o f this chapter is to illustrate how inherent in Western ideology is
a rhetorical vision o f corporeality that links body projects that aim to establish and
communicate a sense o f identity, create identification with others, conform to group
standards, and indicate a sense o f self and social worth. My aim, as in chapter one, is to
deconstruct and demystify this vision o f corporeal sociability. In no longer assuming an
automatic relationship between a specific kind o f corporeality and social worth, human
bodies as they exist in culture can be thought o f differently in regards to social currency.
Instead o f presupposing a necessary relationship between the body and social value, this
approach extricates the body and the modification thereof from dominant social
meanings, thus expanding the conceptual framework through which we understand such
practices. This disarticulation will allow for a de-essentialized vision o f body projects,
thus untethering practices o f body modification from their presumed meanings. In so
doing, this chapter contributes to the overlying thesis o f this project that the Western
conceptualization o f human bodies is a rhetorical construction that encloses and restricts
the potential meanings o f body modification projects. This revision works instead toward
an understanding o f human bodies and modification projects that realizes their full
rhetorical potential.
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Interiority and Sociality: The Corporeal Socialization o f the Self

Beginning in early childhood, the national culture industry rhetorically creates
and reinforces the standards by which we judge the human form. These standards and
expectations are then constantly reinforced as we, our bodies, are socialized. For
example, psychological metaresearch emphasizes the importance society plays on the
categorical construction o f what is deemed “attractive” or not. As Urdy and Eckland
point out: “Folklore tells us that beautiful girls marry handsome princes and live happily
ever after. Heroes are handsome and villains are ugly” (“Benefits o f Being Attractive”
47). The ever-popular children’s fairytale Cinderella tells a story o f a young woman who
is persecuted by her evil step-mother and step-sisters. Though Cinderella is repeatedly
victimized and taken advantage o f by her family, she continues to have a pure, kind, and
loving nature. Cinderella is also a young, thin, Caucasian girl with soft features and big
eyes. Her evil step-mother and sisters, however, are not. They all have twisted, pointy
features and narrow eyes to indicate their inner malevolence. The lesson here is obvious:
popular representations link certain modes o f physicality with happiness and success
based on the assumption that physical nature is indicative of internal nature.
The use o f the human body as a socialization device is a rhetorical outgrowth o f
the underlying cultural assumptions that assume a direct relationship between the body
and the soul. As discussed previously. Western society conceptualizes the body as a
publication device that acts as a buffer between the essential, intangible self and the
material world. Because o f this presupposition, bodies are socially read as markers of
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interiority, thus charging the physical form with meaning only insofar as it relates to
issues o f the self. This cultural understanding o f the body as a publication device
encourages the individual to intentionally act upon his or her own physical form in ways
that seek a socially desired projection o f the self.
This rhetorical performance o f selfness, however, does not occur in a vacuum.
The perceived need to materialize feelings o f “selfness” depends on the presupposition
that our bodies will be socially scrutinized as such. Further, we assume that there are
material social rewards or repercussions for having certain types o f physicality. This
brings to light a new set of assumptions regarding the body as it is presumed to function
in Western society. Because o f their rhetorical nature, bodies are necessarily “read”
intertextually relative to other bodies. But somewhere along the way. Western culture has
come to value certain sizes, shapes, colors, and forms o f bodies over others, bringing
issues o f normativity and power to the forefront. The material effectivity o f this social
valuing o f certain modes o f physicality has created a hierarchy o f bodies in our society,
resulting in cultural mandates that order and categorize bodies.
The social categorizing o f bodies is not a new phenomenon. Bodies have
historically been used as markers o f difference, resulting in the social reading and
evaluating o f difference through physicality. However, when reading bodies as texts,
individuals “come to a system o f discourse with an ideological grid already in place and
participate in terms o f that grid’s determinative nature” (McKerrow 102). In other words,
the social reading o f bodies is filtered through an ideology that has a hierarchy o f social
values rhetorically built into it. This inevitably leads to the ordering and ranking o f the
texts (bodies) according to this hierarchy, causing certain texts (bodies) to be viewed as
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having more innate “worth” than others. For example, the ideology o f the Nazi party
fostered a rhetorical environment in the Third Reich that marginalized certain individuals
with “Jewish bodies,” classifying individuals that had certain “Jewish features” to be o f
inferior character and social worth. According to Jeffrey Herf, “the Jewish body implied
a Jewish character associated with cowardice, sexual rapacity, crime, murderous attacks
on women and children, economic exploitation, communist and capitalism, lack o f
patriotism and subversion o f the nation” (“Ideologies in Comparative Perspective” 4). To
those who identified with the Nazi ideology, the Jewish body signified characteristics that
were contrary to what the Nazis valued. The Jewish body, then, was positioned as “other”
in relation to the Aryan body which was exalted and said to be emblematic o f Nazi
values. In Western culture, contemporary Neo-Nazis continue to order and rank bodies
according to this same hierarchy o f values contained within the Nazi ideology. This
social reading, evaluating, and discriminating o f bodies continues to rely on the
articulation o f physical bodies to internal character, envisioning the human form as the
embodiment o f ideological values. Thus, the social recognition o f coiporeality as the
materialization o f the self is a rhetorical effect that, when coupled with a hierarchy o f
values contained within an ideology, places the body at the center o f judgments that
distinguish between selves that are socially valued and those that are not.
Clearly, the socialization o f human bodies is directly influenced by how cultures
condition individuals to understand how the human form relates to the inner self. Further,
cultures condition individuals to favor certain modes o f eorporeality over others, infusing
the physical body with presumed social value. That value is transferred in social
relations, perpetuating the cultural fascination with bodies as well as the myth that our
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soul— our internal worth— is accessible to others via corporeal representation. In the next
section, the social construction o f the “ideal” body is investigated with the intent o f
further illuminating how bodies are used in Western culture as a tool o f socialization.
This will further demonstrate the reliance o f this process on fundamental assumptions
regarding the body, the interior self, and social value.

Idealizing Society: Constructing a World o f Corporeal Fantasy

The manner in which we socialize our own bodies and read the bodies o f others is
contingent on an understanding o f some “ideal” form o f corporeality. Western culture
consistently values certain types o f bodies. Specific characteristics vary according to
gender, but popular representations o f the human form present certain physical attributes
regarding skin color, stature, age, size, shape, and symmetry as ideal. But what are the
Western ideals o f attractiveness and where do they come from? Some perspectives
maintain that the physical attributes that we consider to be “beautiful” are rooted in our
primitive instincts. Christine Rosen, for example, argues “there is a deeply human
intuition about beauty” (“The Democratization o f Beauty” 2). This outlook views
“beauty” as something that is “natural” and exists separate from cultural constructions o f
physical attractiveness. This viewpoint, however, is widely debated. Richmond and
McCroskey define attractiveness as a “perception” that “does not exist on its own”
(“Nonverbal Behavior in Interpersonal Relations” 16). Instead, beauty is bound up in our
personal and social experiences. This definition implies that attractiveness is not an
inherent trait but rather is culturally constructed, and is dependent on superficial
attributes. Though this school o f thought is widely supported, differing perspectives have
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been offered up to explain how attractiveness is socially constructed and gauged.
Different scholars forward different arguments, but the more fundamental point is how
the debate itself reveals the hegemonic status the body holds in social relations.
“To be beautiful in America,” one individual proclaims, “you need to be young,
thin, and follow the beauty trends forwarded by the mass media.”^ This individual is one
o f many who, when asked what the ideal body is, indicated that beauty is something to be
desired, strived for, and, most importantly, requires constant pursuit. “The fight for
physical perfection is an uphill battle,” another individual explained. “You need to
constantly be dieting, working out, coloring your hair, moisturizing, tanning— and for
what? So that someone can still always be younger than you, thinner than you, or have a
better complexion than you, or something minute like having better eyebrows than you
do.” When questioned what the “perfect” body looks like, everyone has an answer, and
largely, the answers gathered bear some resemblance to one another.
Others who describe a physical attraction to something that seemingly does not fit
the normative model o f ideal attractiveness often qualify their statements o f desire. One
individual explains: “I’m really strange when it comes to fat. On m yself 1 can’t stand it.
On the girls that 1 date ... well, let’s just say 1 don’t mind heavy girls. It’s weird, 1 know,
but 1 don’t want my partner to look like me naked.” This young man qualifies his
attraction to “heavy” girls with the words “strange” and “weird,” acknowledging that the
model o f beauty he values is distinct from normative society’s ideals. He does not feel the
need, however, to qualify his hate for fat on himself, because he perceives this to be a
socially acceptable sentiment. Another respondent shows a similar response. When asked
what the perfect male physique looked like, she replies: “The male models are usually fit
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but not overly muscular, handsome without being overly pretty. 1 guess my idea o f a
‘perfect’ guy is a little odd in comparison. 1 like guys who are a little chubbier, a little
more rugged looking.” This respondent also casts her gaze at mainstream representations
o f male bodies in order to structure her own model o f desire. She qualifies her preference
with the word “odd,” and consistently compares her standards to what she views as the
normative preference for male bodies. Clearly, it is not to say that “mainstream”
standards o f attractiveness necessarily dictate individual desires, as deviations from the
norm clearly exist, but rather that these desires exist in contrast to and are shaped by the
normative ideal.
Though it is true that certain groups, specifically spectacular countercultures and
enclaves, have stylistically “different” ideals o f physicality, they too must cast their gaze
at normative conceptions o f the body in order to reject them. One organization, for
instance, the National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance (NAAFA) may value
human bodies that are larger than “average,” but there has to be an acknowledged
“average” for such a position to exist. The mere existence of this group shines light on a
larger issue— body fat is largely not socially accepted. In fact, the average weight for an
American female is actually heavier than the “ideal” weight. According to the National
Center for Health Statistics, the average American woman is 5’4” and weighs 163
pounds, though the “healthy weight” for this height peaks at 144 po u n d s/ USA Today
reports, however, that the average female model is 5’11” and weighs around 120 pounds,
which would be drastically “underweight” by the United States Department o f Health and
Human Services’ standards.^ Because o f the idealized status these models are perceived
to have, however, many women are left feeling that they are drastically heavier and, thus.
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less attractive, than the average female. Without the need to forward “fat acceptance”
NAAFA would have no purpose. Its mere existence, then, is organized by dominant
mainstream ideals o f corporeality, and it is precisely in this manner that the body is
hegemonic in social relations.
Though considered a very prominent issue for women, men do not escape this
perceived necessity to lose weight. You may be familiar with Jared Fogle, the public face
o f Subway Restaurants. Fogle “earned” his celebrity for losing 245 pounds on “the
Subway Diet” and is now a recognized pop culture icon and called a “hero” by some.
Fogle’s fame, however, is dependent on his shrinking frame. The sole reason for public
interest in his story is because he “chose” not to continue to be obese. “If people didn’t
give a damn, I wouldn’t be in the position I’m in,” Fogle said in an interview with CNN.^
Fogle’s story drew large media attention because o f his “fight” against fat. Fogle’s
newfound celebrity status further enforces the assumption that fatness is unacceptable.
Further, his story tells Americans that the only people to “blame” for fat are ourselves.
An accurate representation o f what is considered to be “ideal” in American
culture can be seen in magazines, on billboards, on television, and at the movies. Images
o f actresses like Scarlett Johansen and fashion models like Heidi Klum recruit men and
women alike, informing them with assumptions o f what it means to be beautiful,
feminine, and sexually desirable. Men and women view bodies in the likeness o f Brad
Pitt’s and Mark W halberg’s as ideal representations o f desirability, masculinity, and
strength. Further, these representations tell the general public that these are gender
specific qualities that should be strived for. It is through the use o f these bodies and their
societal prominence that normative gender ideals are perpetuated, thus ensuring the
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hegemonic polarization o f the sexes. These bodies and the ways in which they are
culturally upheld tell us that women should be docile and men strong, women should be
beautiful and delicate and men striking and rugged, women to look like sex and men to
look like industry. Though performative deviations from these dichotomous gender-roles
exist, they are quickly labeled by the culture industry, qualified as trend, and ultimately
distanced from the “true” ideal man.
The metrosexual, for example, was supposed to be the new ideal model for
American men. “Metrosexual” is used to describe a straight man that practices what
normative society describes as “homosexual” male traits, mainly an interest in fashion
and physical appearance. By labeling a man who explicitly cares about how he outwardly
appears to others “metrosexual,” the culture industry automatically distinguishes him
from the normative American male. Qualifying these traits as stereotypically homosexual
only further enforces the normative perception that straight male should be indifferent to
fashion labels and skin products. Finally, after much attention was spent on the “new”
metrosexual American man, stories like “Metrosexual is out, Macho is in” began to
circulate in the mass media, proclaiming the “death” o f the metrosexual.^ Though there
are still men labeled as such by the media and by society, they are no longer thought to
possess traits true to the normative standards o f ideal masculinity.
Human bodies are all around us, and the culture industry tells the American public
what they should look like. M edia representations o f the ideal body tell women that they
are expected to be forever frozen in their twenties, narrow-hipped, thin but voluptuous,
have big eyes, with light, clear skin, long flowing hair, no body hair, and should be
“perfectly” made-up all the time. The perceived ideal shape for men is to be a tall, broad-
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shouldered, twenty-something with a chiseled abdomen, clear skin, and a seemingly
effortless “I just fell out o f bed looking this good” look. How an individual is
subjectified, however, determines how he or she will approach, read, and react to a text.
A subject position is “a stance, role, or perspective one takes in relationship to a text so as
to read or engage the text” (Brummet and Bowers 118). The texts in this case are the
culture industry’s widely available representations o f the ideal body, as well as the
material bodies a subject comes into contact with. Depending on how an individual is
discursively positioned, he/she will engage the text (body) differently. An individual who
inhabits an identified subject position, for instance, will find “characters, themes or
images in the text with which he or she identifies, or desires to identify” (118). The
beauty industry tells identified subjects that they want whiter teeth (but not too white),
tanned skin (but not too tan), bigger boobs and muscles (but not too big), a flatter
stomach (free of stretch marks, scars, and cellulite), line-free skin, and on the list goes.
These somewhat dynamic guidelines are fixed in rhetorically constituted cultural values
that cherish certain gender specific characteristics such as youth, attractiveness, and
whiteness, while condemning physical differences. A subversive subject position,
however, will be “at odds with, and often directly opposed to, the call o f the text” (119).
The texts produced by the culture industry still call to these subjects, but their subject
positions encourage a different reading and/or reaction that rejects the message
(normative standards) but still continues to constitute them as subjects. The normative
guidelines communicated through these texts cause individuals to act upon their bodies to
either adhere to or explicitly reject cultural mandates. These actions, then, are rhetorical
effects that are shaped by the normative ideal.
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Assuming that certain physical characteristics are inherently “better” than others,
individuals are pressured to conform to normative standards o f “normalcy” to be socially
accepted and even privileged. The cultural desire for “perfection” propels individuals to
discipline their bodies and to intentionally manipulate their physical features as rhetorical
symbols o f social status and worth. Cindy Jackson is a prime example o f the actions
taken in order to attain a cultural ideal. Jackson has undergone 46 operations in the past
16 years to completely transform her physical form. “It was to look better. It was to get a
different life” she explains in an interview with The Independent^ Her actions
demonstrate a cultural belief that corporeality is directly linked to lifestyle, and that the
ideal she pursued would socially benefit her. And she is not wrong: Jackson enjoys a
lucrative lifestyle o f fame and fortune based solely on the visibility she has gotten for her
Barbie-like near perfection.
In a CBS News interview Jackson muses over her upbringing: “I wasn’t that good
looking. And my sister was really, really a pretty girl. She was breathtaking. And
everyone used to talk to her more and smile at her more and notice her f ir s t.J a c k s o n ’s
experience is not uncommon. A large body o f research in the social sciences has been
dedicated to the investigation o f the role physical attractiveness plays in social situations.
According to Debra Gimlin “the body is arguably the location from which all social life
begins” {Body Work 8). Because o f the intangibility o f the self and the cultural
assumptions regarding how the body and the self are related, individuals are initially read
and socialized based on their physical appearances. Research conducted by William
Goldman and Philip Lewis investigated the “physical attractiveness stereotype” in which
society tends “to attribute ipso facto to the physically attractive such qualities as
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intelligence, warmth, and capability” (“What is Beautiful is Good” 126). The mere
presence o f this stereotype indicates the cultural trend to articulate physical appearance
with social worth, and more so, positively correlating such attributes with one another.
Further, this stereotype demonstrates the assumptions outlined in the first chapter that
articulate the human form with interiority. Though the study did find that physical
attractiveness and social skill fulness were significantly correlated, the researchers also
acknowledged differential socialization as a potential cause o f this. This theory assumes
that children regarded as “attractive” receive positive reactions growing up and, thus,
become more comfortable in social situations. If this is the case, the cultural ingrained
inclination to treat the physically “attractive” more favorably is already at work. This is
the materialization o f rhetorically constructed values.
Research regarding any correlation between the physical appearance o f an
individual and his/her character or social prowess frequently assess findings as a result of
how individuals are socialized. Social scientists largely agree that individuals who are
deemed “physically attractive” time “receive more opportunities for social interaction
which provides them with a larger social repertoire than unattractive people” (Zakahi and
Duran 55). Goldman and Lewis agree as they claim that there is evidence that “morephysical 1y-attractive subjects are more generally liked than the more unattractive
subjects” (129). It is possible that findings such as these can be explained using the “halo
effect,” meaning that individuals are perceived as being more proficient in certain areas
“simply because they are attractive” (Zakahi and Duran 56). This trend illustrates a
cyclical social logic that treats individuals in a certain way because o f the way they
physically look. This treatment is justified by the presumption o f positive personality
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traits that are generally developed as a result o f the nature o f their very socialization.
Clearly, because o f the ways we are socialized, the shape and form o f the human body
has bearings on matters that fundamentally have no “real” association. Because o f this,
bodies inevitably play a role in unequal power distribution in stratified societies.
The “ideal” body is not a real entity, but a rhetorical construction. Even the
fashion models depicted in New York’s Times Square have been airbrushed and digitally
“doctored” to symbolize what the advertiser wishes/desires/perceives to be the “perfect”
woman or man. To be socially viewed as normatively aceeptable or attractive one must
constantly engage in “positive” body projects. No matter how hard one works to
transform their physical form, there is always something that can be tweaked— there is
always at least one “imperfeetion” an individual can improve upon. A short story by
Nathaniel Hawthorne, entitled “The Birthmark,” calls such perceived imperfections
“mark[s] of mortality” (21); an indication o f our very humanity. Hawthorne tells the
story of the insatiable professor Aylmer who becomes obsessed with ridding his almost
perfectly beautiful wife o f a small birthmark on her cheek. Aylmer cannot enjoy the
immense beauty o f his wife’s body and soul because he is fixated on perfecting her
complexion. The birthmark begins to take on deeper meaning to Aylmer as “the symbol
o f his wife’s liability to sin, sorrow, decay, and death” (12). At one moment within the
story, Aylmer’s wife, Georgiana, recognizes that Aylmer will not remain satisfied if he is
to succeed. Hawthorne writes; “Longer than one moment she well knew it could not be;
for his spirit was ever on the march, ever ascending, and each instant required something
that was beyond the scope o f the instant before” (21). Georgiana’s recognition o f her
husband’s never-ending pursuit o f progress, however, does not keep her from risking
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permanent disfigurement or even death because the birthmark becomes all the couple can
focus on. Death, indeed, is the price the poor woman pays for her bodily perfection.
The stories o f Cindy Jackson and Miles Kendall, though less tragic, demonstrate a
similar insatiable thirst for bodily perfection. In 2003, Cindy Jackson had spent
approximately $100,000 on 47 different cosmetic surgery procedures in her quest for
Barbie-like beauty. In several interviews that year she was quoted as saying that her
“dreams had finally come true.” '*’ On the contrary, as o f 2006 Jackson’s 47 procedures
had become 62. Her “dreams” o f feminine perfection have still not been reached.
Jackson’s male protégé, former website designer Miles Kendall, has had only two
operations and nine procedures, but has entirely reconstructed the appearance o f his face
over the past six years. Now working in the world o f celebrity, however, Kendall feels
more pressure than ever to “keep up with [his] appearances.” "T he Western ideology o f
beauty seems to forward an unattainable ideal, but it is more than that. Built into the
notion o f the ideal body is an idea o f product as progress; the ideal body is a neverending process that can never actually be attained by anyone. There is no finished
product. Culturally, we understand the body as a project that requires constant attention
and diligence to maintain social acceptability. Inherent in the notion o f the ideal male or
female body is its modification, which is usually thought o f as “improvement.”
Ironically, an unmodified body, then, is socially viewed as unnatural.
Normalcy is clearly framed by representations o f beauty ideals that can be seen in
the rhetorical artifacts o f popular media. W omen’s magazines especially encourage the
constant modification o f the female body in order to be viewed as beautiful, desirable,
and socially accepted. Headlines on the cover o f these magazines scream; “ 10 Steps to
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the Perfect Butt,” “Lose 10 Pounds by Swimsuit Season,” or “Get the Body Y ou’ve
Always Dreamed Of.” These magazines are setting the Western women’s agenda,
prompting her to constantly be thinking about ways to improve upon her physicality. One
individual describes her quest for the ideal female body: “Though 1 know these girls are
airbrushed and have a team o f stylists who work for hours to make them look perfect, I
still use them as sort of a standard, a way to see how much further I have to go. So until
Cosmo[politan Magazine] starts showcasing girls who look like me, I’ll continue to hit
the gym, buy the ‘Lean Cuisines,’ and spend too much o f my paycheck in the cosmetics
department.” This young woman’s cultural experience indicates that routine daily rituals
o f bodily discipline are a “natural” part o f female corporeality. The failure to comply
with society’s expectations, then, would result in a socially abject “unnatural” female
body.
Thus, innate in the ideal model are the characteristics o ï fragmentation (the body
is a series o f parts instead o f one functional whole) and process (the ideal body is never
finished). The cultural machine uses this rhetorically constructed ideal to situate
corporeality at the center o f social transactions. The next section illuminates how the
assumptions linking physicality and interiority in combination with socially enforced
standards o f acceptable or desirable physicality result in the attachment o f social value to
the human body (and its parts).

T h e B u sin ess o f B odies: Ideal B odies and C orporeal S ocialization

Because o f the Western fixation on physicality and interiority, we are constantly
aware o f our bodies and the bodies o f others. According to Sharon Crowley, women’s

75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

social worth is measured “through and by their bodies” forcing women “to become
highly conscious o f their bodies— the space they occupy in a room, on the street, in a
crowd” (“Afterward” 358). A constant awareness o f our own bodies inadvertently results
in the awareness and evaluation o f other bodies in comparison to own. Crowley argues
that women’s bodies are constantly under scrutiny, socially evaluated as to whether or not
they are virginal, impregnable, or attractive. Yet, while the male gaze is a pressing issue
for women, men do not escape the social scrutiny o f others based on their appearance.
The social stigmatism o f fat, for example, is gender blind. Wanting to avoid the harsh
criticism of others and feeding the need to be socially accepted, men and women alike go
to the gym, go on crash diets, and even develop eating disorders.
The material social rewards for having the “right” type o f body are undeniable. It
is just as Rosen postulates: “beauty is a valuable commodity” (1). Leora Farber agrees as
she suggests that “skin holds particular currency for Westernized women and
(increasingly) men” (“Skin Aesthetics” 247). This can explicitly be seen in the United
State’s historical struggle with racism. The Jim Crow Laws enacted and enforced in the
early 1900’s physically separated and socially marked the status and worth o f humans
based on the color o f their skin. Bodies with black skin were read intertextually with
other bodies, especially in relation to white bodies, resulting in the social devaluation o f
black skin. Though mandating that facilities and treatment for individuals with dark skin
be separate-but-equal, the Jim Crow Era marked individuals with an “undesirable” skin
color with an inferior status. This is a prime example o f hegemonic transference o f power
and social worth based on mere physicality.
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Our bodies are rhetorically charged with cultural value, and our bodies are
figuratively and literally used in social exchange to transmit a desired good or service.
The language surrounding bodies treats corporeality as commerce, thus indicating the
presumed intrinsic social value placed on certain forms o f corporeality that can be used in
social bartering. Certain forms o f corporeality can be used as currency, a sort o f
“bargaining chip” to gain desired social responses and reach particular outcomes in social
situations. In an interview with CBS news. Miles Kendall explains that his ability to open
his new bar is due, in large part, to his new looks. Using his body to enhance his business,
Kendall relies on society’s largely held assumption that outward appearance signals
social worth. “People call me shallow. But I call society shallow, because they treat me
differently now.” Cindy Jackson shares a similar sentiment when she states, “there are so
many people who are being held back by their looks, and if that can give them a better
quality o f life and make them happier—what else is more important in life?” (“Becoming
Barbie,” 2). When they were “ordinary” people, Kendall and Jackson strived for a better
quality o f life and the route to success was mapped out on the body. Jackson’s lifetime
quest is to look like a Barbie doll to live a “glamorous life.” Kendall embarks on a similar
quest for Ken doll-like perfection. Both cases demonstrate a cultural assumption that
successful, self-content people must embody social ideals. Giving new meaning to the
term “dress for success” the two “extreme makeover” cases assumed that to have success,
you must first look like it.
Physical attractiveness, then, acts as a social commodity— a social freight that is
in high demand. On one hand, there is the literal exchange o f bodies for money, such as
in the practices o f human trafficking and in prostitution. Human bodies in these types o f
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transactions carry a specific dollar value. In other situations, individuals are socially
rewarded for physically “fitting-in” or adhering to “mainstream” standards o f physicality.
For instance, some research shows that in cases o f workplace sexual harassment,
attractive victims were more likely to be believed than unattractive victims (Seiter and
Dunn 2000), while other research shows that attractive defendants in court room
proceedings received, on average, lower bail or fine amounts than less-attractive
defendants (Downs and Lyons 1991). Though these societal situations are seemingly
untouched by issues o f corporeality, the size, shape, and form o f the human body clearly
plays a significant role in the organization and distribution of power.
The business o f bodies is made explicit in the industry o f cosmetic surgery. The
innovation has placed a dollar amount on bodies, as the industry promises the
transformation o f certain body parts for a set price. The power o f the industry has
maximized the capacity with which one can attain cultural ideals o f “normalcy” or
“perfection.” This, however, contributes to the social marking o f status on physicality.
Because it is socially known that “perfect” noses, breasts, foreheads, eyes, waistlines and
the like can be purchased, there is less social tolerance for the less-than-perfect physique.
If the “right” type o f body is made increasingly available through cosmetic surgery,
individuals are held personally responsible for deviations from the norm. Further, if one
does not participate in the systematic maintenance and modification o f the body to meet
societal standards, it is socially read as a marker o f inferior socio-economic status or
mental health. “Imperfect” bodies are largely read as signifiers o f laziness, lower
economic status, depression/mental instability, and/or subversion. For example, the
stigma o f fat is, to a certain extent, a cultural fiction. With the exception o f cases o f
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obesity, which can lead to the failure o f vital organs and arteries, body fat is not
intrinsically harmful to the human body and is actually used by the body in useful ways.
Obese, overweight, and even individuals who do not fall into the “thin” category,
however, are often critieized for their physique because it is allegedly so easily
countered. An individual has many practices from which to choose to alter the size o f
his/her body such as diet, exercise, liposuction, or even gastric bypass surgery. The
failure to participate in any o f the aforementioned practices for whatever reason is thus
regarded as negligence. The mass production o f normative bodies is made possible by
this industry, further widening the perceived gap between “normative” bodies and
“marginal” bodies.
Using cosmetic surgery as a springboard, another realm o f the culture industry
that has capitalized on the urgency for “normalized” bodies is reality television. As
previously discussed, it is not a new phenomenon to equate a change in physical
appearance with a change o f selfness. Traditional fairytales often center on this theme.
“Beauty and the Beast,” for example, tells the story o f a man who is transformed into a
beast as retribution for his cruel, greedy, and selfish demeanor. It is only after the Beast
learns to be kind, generous, and falls in love that he is transformed into a handsome
nobleman. His change in appearance signifies a change o f heart. With the advent o f
television, this representation has been made more explicit and abundant in contemporary
society. New television program formats and plotlines extend this articulation. Daytime
talk shows often offer a makeover to compliment a new outlook on life. Guests who
come in to talk about low self-esteem, divorces, and discontentment are offered a new
hairstyle, wardrobe and makeup to aid the transition to a new way o f life. For example, a
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current call to “The Ricki Lake Show” on the official website prompts visitors to apply to
be on the show if they have lost 100 pounds and “need a makeover to show off [their]
new look. The new physical appearance is meant to signify an internal change, as well as
be used as a catalyst toward starting a new life. The recent explosion o f reality television,
however, has taken the articulation o f bodies, selfness, and lifestyle to a whole new level.
The television series “Extreme Makeover” is emblematic o f this phenomenon. On the
show, men and women alike undergo entire body transformations with the help o f plastic
surgeons, eye surgeons, cosmetic dentists, hair stylists, and makeup artists. The show is
framed as providing contestants with “a real life fairy tale in which their wishes come
true, not just by changing their looks, but their lives and destinies.” '^ The marriage o f
cosmetic surgery and reality television explicitly makes the connection between physical
appearance and the lives we live, as well as making numerous procedures visible, and
thus accessible, to the general public. Following the lead o f “Extreme Makeover,” many
reality television shows center on this theme, including “Dr. 90210,” “Celebrity LookAlikes,” “ 10 Years Younger,” “The Biggest Loser,” and “1 Want a Famous Face.” These
displays normalize extreme makeovers and assist in removing social stigma from many
cosmetic surgery procedures.
Cultural trends such as these perpetuate the business o f bodies. They provide
resources necessary for the conceptualization o f the body as a fragmented project o f the
self that is used both literally and figuratively for the social ordering and advancement o f
the self. The assumptions linking the body to interiority are amplified here, assuming that
bodies should be indicative o f character and social worth. This causes the social reading
o f bodies as such, perpetuating the cycle. According to Robert Hariman, “status is a
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concomitant o f socializing” and “attributing status is a social act” (“Status, Marginality,
and Rhetorical Theory” 43). Texts, and therefore bodies as texts, do not have any
inherent status, but only that which we grant them. Rhetorically constructed ideals of
bodies encourage Western society to favor one mode o f physicality over others, linking
different forms o f corporeality with different internal states o f being and worth. This
allows for the social stratification o f bodies oriented by a hegemonic hierarchy o f power
that determines what is “normal” or “acceptable” and what is not. This inevitably leads us
to marginalize certain types o f bodies, thus leading to negative social projection and the
assumption o f inferior social worth.
The cultural ideals imposed on “normative bodies” influence and constrict
“marginal bodies.” The final section deals with the relationship between normativity and
marginality, and interrogates non-normative body projects as they are used and
understood in marginal culture.

Normative Ideals and Peripheral Corporealitv

As previously discussed, the normative conception o f “ideal” Western bodies has
the notion o f body modification built into it. However, commonplace everyday rituals
that “normalize” the body are often not consciously thought o f body modification, but
rather, as personal hygiene, grooming, or self-maintenance. As discussed in the first
chapter, distinctions between what is considered to be self-maintenance, body
modification, and self-mutilation are made through social narratives. Body modification
acts must be considered in regards to their larger cultural context as well as the framing
o f such acts by the communities and individuals that engage in them. Though one group
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may consider an act to be a declaration o f “self ’ and of spirituality, if normative culture
does not share this sentiment the act in question is inevitably trivialized as “trend” or
marginalized as “mutilation.”
This can be seen as happening with highly visible body modification practices
such as tattooing. Tattooing is becoming increasingly normalized, gaining the visibility
and endorsement o f popular culture. For instance, former Playboy Playmate Bunny o f the
Year Pamela Anderson— a popular sex symbol that represents feminine sexuality and
beauty to many— sports several tattoos. Her participation in the act allows for certain
types o f tattooing to be viewed as sexy or feminine. Though not considered to be
emblematic o f the natural, ideal body, moderate tattooing has become widely accepted
and incorporated into dominant models o f attractiveness and desirability. What society
deems to be “excessive” tattooing, however, continues to be stigmatized. Eric Sprague,
better known as “The Lizardman,” has participated in approximately 650 hours o f
tattooing that now cover his entire body, including his scalp and eyelids.'^ This type o f
tattooing continues to be socially rejected, and is read by others as signs o f mental illness
or instability. To avoid this type o f social castigation, individuals are forced take a certain
level of care in the selection o f body modification practices they choose to partake in and
in the ways in which they frame them. The way practices are understood to function and
personal motives and significations attached to them, then, exist within and are inevitably
shaped by this larger rhetorical environment. This environment invariably provides
resources for body modification projects while limiting their potential meanings.
There are various ways body modification projects are used to socialize the self.
As previously discussed, many instances o f body modification are used to “normalize”
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the self and to fit into mainstream culture. Cindy Jackson and Miles Kendall, for
example, may have used methods that are socially deemed to be “extreme” to mold and
shape their bodies, but their results adhere to social standards o f acceptability and beauty.
The social results for their actions, then, have been positive, granting both subjects fame
and fortune based on their physical transformation. Other “extreme” body modifiers, such
as Stalking Cat, who was discussed in the first chapter, and the Lizardman, have not been
given the same social reception. Because o f the types o f bodies these men have come to
possess, society has responded by criticizing, marginalizing, and even fearing the two
subjects. Though Cindy Jackson and Stalking Cat both had an ideal in mind and went to
great lengths to achieve it, because o f the normalized standards imposed on bodies, the
end result plays a large role in the social acceptance o f the process o f transformation. The
process, however, is empirically equivalent.
Though not culturally considered as “normative bodies,” individuals who use
their bodies to socialize within marginal society continue to do so based on the
fundamental assumptions called on by “mainstream” culture. Countercultures and
spectacular subcultures, though aiming for different forms o f corporeality, still
understand the body to be functioning both as a publication device o f the essential “s e lf’
and as a socialization device, relating that “s e lf’ to the “other.” Marginal body
modification projects, then, continue to function in the same way as normative body
projects. Because the body is culturally assumed to be directly related to the intangible,
essential self, the potential signification o f body projects is constrained to the nature of
this self and how that is socially valued. This encourages body modification projects that
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aim to establish and communicate a sense o f identity, create identification with others,
conform to group standards, and indicate a desired sense o f self and social worth.
Different practices o f body modification, however, can mean very different
things. Tattooing, for example, can serve any number o f personal or social purposes. For
instance, a particular symbol etched into the skin can signal membership into a
spectacular subculture. A “skinhead” may get a swastika tattoo and shave his/her head to
be initiated into that group. He or she could also be receiving that same tattoo to create
identification with others who view participate and adhere to the neo-Nazi ideology as a
fundamental part o f his/her inner-being. He or she could also be conforming to group
standards, altering his or her physieal appearance to suit the norm o f the social group. All
o f these practices, however, are carried out based on the assumption that the body is used
as a socialization tool o f the self. All are intended to signal some notion o f self, whether it
be an embodied identity or merely gesturing at the identification with an ideology, thus
linking character to physical presence. Whether or not modes o f physical adornment have
pronounced social intent, the intentional changing o f one’s physical form to correspond
with a system o f beliefs or and induction into a subculture signals a perceived notion of
selfhood. Though the act o f modification may serve solely social purposes at a conscious
level, the need to physically signal an adherence to a given ideology is driven by the
same assumption that links the interior o f one’s being to their physical form. The acts of
modification in both o f these cases are using the body as a tool to make internal feelings
o f self and identity tangible and subject to be read and interpreted by others. These
modifications are an attempt by the individual to describe him/herself as a specific type
o f person. Through use o f the body, a modifier can make an internal notion o f self both
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external and palpable in order to be recognized and understood in a manner that is
congruent to an affective identity. An individual can just as easily verbally express to
another person that he or she is a skinhead, but the physical act o f modification
personally and socially codifies that identification, as well as allowing the individual and
those “reading” his or her body to visualize an otherwise immaterial feeling o f
transformation and/or identity.

Conclusions

As soon as an individual begins to understand the body to function in a certain
way, he or she reads bodies according to a set o f assumptions, as well as in relation to
other bodies, creating an intertextual rhetorical environment within which our bodies
circulate. Our understandings o f selfness, o f corporeality, and o f sociality, and how the
three relate to one another are contingent on this environment and the underlying
ideological assumptions it generates. Providing the resources for interpretation and
meaning-making activités, these self-exercising assumptions have a hegemonic function,
constraining and limiting our perceptions o f “reality.” The “realities” o f bodies, then,
depend on the interplay o f rhetoric, hierarchy, and power creating certain societal
guidelines through which we “read” and favor certain modes o f physicality and methods
of production, maintenance, and manipulation o f the human form.
Only when we recognize the extent to which our bodies are rhetorically
constrained can we begin to envision the body and its modification to function in
different ways. The first chapter illuminated how Western culture has been conditioned to
understand the body to act as a publication device. Based on this articulation, society has
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corne to charge the body with social significance that allows for certain bodies to be
privileged over others. As American ideology is built on certain fundamental themes that
decidedly determine what is culturally honored and valued, bodies that seemingly
materialize these themes are charged with higher social worth. The material transference
o f this presumed worth only perpetuates this myth, resulting in a social consciousness of
human bodies.
This consciousness o f the body inadvertently pressures individuals to either strive
to meet societal standards o f physicality, or to consciously reject them. Rejection o f these
standards, however, is performed in such a fashion that continues to meet the cultural
expectation corporeal socialization. In other words, the situating o f the body at the center
o f sociality is a rhetorical effect that can be seen both in the mainstream and on the
margins o f contemporary society. Once the body is disarticulated from the “soul,” the
socialization o f the human body will be at once complicated and simplified. In not
assuming an automatic relationship between selfness and corporeality, the rhetorical
charging o f certain modes o f physicality will be problematized. This will allow for the
body and its modification to be understood in new inventive ways.
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CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICAL SELVES, POLITICAL BODIES:
MODIFIYING THE BODY POLITIC
The second chapter o f this project examined cultural assumptions that promote an
understanding o f the body as a publication device o f the self. Chapter three extended this
analysis in its illustration o f how the assumed relationship between the body and the
interior self fosters a rhetorical vision o f corporeality that understands the body as a
socialization device. These chapters, then, deal with the human body as a site o f the
struggle over personal and social meaning. This chapter, by extension, deals with the
body as a site o f political struggle and signification. Because o f the assumptions dealt
with previously, bodies have become thoroughly politicized. The use o f the physieal body
as a locus for political action and signification is largely intertwined with the human
form’s assumed relationship with selfness, subjectivity, sociality, and citizenship.
Throughout the course o f this chapter, I will demonstrate the ways in which these
associations lend political agency to the body while simultaneously restricting the body’s
signifying potential.
Although bodies are commonly integrated into larger rhetorical strategies to
accomplish political aims, this chapter focuses on body projects that consciously alter the
human form with the express intent o f modifying a surrounding environment. In other
words, I will investigate acts o f modification that envision the body as instrumental in
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accomplishing political aims. In so doing, I will demonstrate the ways in which the
presumed relation between the external self, the essential self, and the social self lend
meaning to the body as a political device. Further, I will illuminate how bodily practices
that are framed or read as seeking political goals gain cultural urgency from the
assumptions outlined in the first two chapters, thus reaffirming a cultural belief in the
politicized body.
In short, the aim o f this chapter is to interrogate the intentions and perceptions o f
“political” practices o f body modification with the goal o f illustrating the reliance o f
these practices on a rhetorically constructed vision o f corporeality. Thus, this chapter
contributes to the overarching thesis o f this project that the Western conceptualization of
human bodies is a rhetorical construction that encloses and restricts the potential
meanings o f body modification projects. My aim, then, is to demystify the vision o f
political bodies in order to open up new avenues for the consideration o f a personally,
socially, and politically meaningful corpus. Leading this analysis is Morgan Spurlock’s
rhetorical use o f fatness in his award-winning documentary Super-Size Me in order to
make a social and political statement against fast food corporations and the growing
epidemic o f obesity. Through the unique framing o f voluntary fatness, Spurlock uses his
body as a springboard to make an argument against fast food culture. He combines the
social stigma o f fatness with a politically framed body project to stimulate cultural
anxieties about bodies, selves, and health in order to use his body to modify his
environment. The analysis o f this documentary will be combined with discussion and
analysis o f other instances o f explicitly “political” body modification— specifically the
hunger strikes o f student activists and the self-immolation o f anti-war protesters. These
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practices will be juxtaposed with similar acts o f body modification that are not
individually or socially framed as signaling political commitments or interests. This
comparison will assist my previous claims regarding the rhetorical construction of
categories o f body projects, as well as the social valuing o f particular types o f bodies in
relation to the self and other bodies.
Ultimately, this chapter acts as a culmination o f the previous two. 1 intend to
further demonstrate the aforementioned assumptions at work within political body
projects, while using this category o f body modification to demonstrate their usefulness.
Finally, I will demonstrate how the successfulness o f such body projects depends on the
individual’s ability to use the cultural assumptions outlined in chapters two and three o f
this project while simultaneously disarticulating them.

Political Bodv Projects: Modifying the Self. Modifying the Environment

The use o f the body as a resource for political action is not a new concept.
Precisely because o f the assumptions diseussed in earlier chapters, in one way or another,
human bodies have long been at the center o f political struggle. For example, raced
bodies and sexed bodies were used as primary resources for the marginalization o f certain
citizens, thus limiting their capacity to participate in public deliberation and the politieal
process. The women’s suffrage movement, for example, was formed to extend the right
to vote to women who had historically been left out o f public deliberation and the
political process. This political marginalization occurred largely at the site o f the body, as
the female sexed body presumably marked a politically incompetent or inept citizen. For
example, before the W omen’s Rights Movement, women were largely kept out o f politics
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by physically not allowing them to participate in politieal activity. One instanee o f this
occurred in 1840, when Lucretia Coffin Mott was not allowed to participate in the World
Anti-Slavery Convention in London because o f her sex. She was physically kept out of
the convention, and her exelusion ultimately sparked the organization o f the first
women’s rights eonvention (Wood, Gendered Lives). Her female anatomy somehow
signified her political competency (or lack thereof) resulting in her formal exclusion from
participation. The same types o f confliets can be seen historically in America’s social and
political race struggles. Before the abolition o f slavery, raced bodies were legally
reeognized to be indieators o f inferior beings, marking certain bodies as property and
others as citizens. Even after abolition, raced bodies struggled for political rights and
social status. These struggles continue today.
Human bodies are also used both as a hegemonic rhetorical tool to perpetuate
gender norms and expeetations and as a subversive rhetorieal tool to refute them. For
example, stereotypical senses o f femininity typically physical and are thus carried out on
the body. Because o f this, some feminists choose to consciously de-feminize the sexed
body to make a “statement” against eonventional conceptions o f womanhood and beaiity.
A famous example o f women refusing to conform to beauty standards was at the 1968
Miss Ameriea pageant. In a demonstration against the pageant, women protested “by
throwing false eyelashes, bras, and girdles into what they called the Freedom Trash Can”
(Wood 64). This demonstration was enacted to give voice to women by rejecting “the
view of women as sex objects” (Wood 65). This political and social protest was clearly
focused on issues o f the normative feminine body.
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Bodies have also been positioned at the center o f policy building, as is the case
with attempts to legislate and regulate human bodies in regards to issues such as slavery,
prostitution, reproduetion/abortion, and suicide. The legal battle o f the practice of
abortion is a prime example o f this. Even since the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court case Roe v.
Wade legalized abortion in all 50 states, pro-life and pro-choice activists clash over the
issue o f pregnant bodies and unborn bodies. Pro-life activists desire legislation to be
passed to regulate pregnant bodies, arguing that the unborn bodies inside constitute living
beings. Pro-choice activists use the slogan “My Body, My Choice” to refuse the legal
regulation o f pregnant and unborn bodies. Many o f the debates focus on the issue of
“when life begins,” centering on the interior issues o f selfness and the spirit. Women
have similarly struggled over reproductive rights and the right to birth control. Margaret
Sanger, one o f the most visible advocates for “voluntary motherhood,” insisted that “a
woman’s body belongs to herself alone. It is her body. It does not belong to the Church. It
does not belong to the United States o f America or any other government on the face of
the earth . . . . Enforced motherhood is the most complete denial o f a woman’s right to
life and liberty” (as cited in Wood 62). Clearly, central to the issue at hand is the
governance o f the female body.
Another example o f the state’s attempt to legislate bodies is the continuing debate
over the topic o f assisted suicide. The highly publicized 12-year court battle over the life
and death (and body) o f Terri Sehiavo is a key instanee o f this. Michael Schiavo, Terri’s
husband, asserted that his wife had no desire to live in a vegetative state. The Florida
woman’s family, however, fought to keep her alive. Despite the passing o f the case
through the Florida court system and the rulings o f nine judges on the matter over the
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years, on March 21, 2005 congress passed a bill which was immediately signed into law
“that could trigger a federal court review and a quick restoration o f feeding tubes needed
to keep the brain-injured Florida woman alive.” ' The federal courts, however, turned
down the motion, and the patient died just over a week later. This is but one example of
legislation that has been introduced to attempt to regulate the body and outlaw suicide
and euthanasia. The same issues o f ownership and governance apply.
Bodies have also been used in social movements to attract attention, create
physical barricades, and to signify opposing ideologies. Kevin Michael DeLuca, for
example, describes the body rhetoric o f activist groups such as “Earth First!,” “Act Up,”
and “Queer Nation.” He maintains that such groups rely on the dissemination o f images
o f “vulnerable bodies, dangerous bodies, taboo bodies, ludicrous bodies, transfigured
bodies” to constitute “a nascent body rhetoric that deploys bodies as a pivotal resource
for the crucial practice o f public argumentation” (“Unruly Arguments” 10). Such activist
groups, he argues, use their bodies as both “flags to attract attention for the argument”
and as “the site and substance o f the argument itse lf’ (10). The Human Shield movement
uses bodies in a similar fashion. In January o f 2003, hundreds o f “Western anti-war
activists” traveled to Iraq to act as human shields “to try and stop the rush to war.”^ The
action assumed that the presence o f socially valued Western (mostly white) bodies would
act as a physical deterrent for the invasion o f Iraq and the bombing and killing o f
(presumably) less valuable bodies. Clearly, then, the body functions as both a locus o f
political contestation and a useful resource for political argumentation. This chapter,
however, focuses on spectacular body modification projects that are used to influence or
modify a surrounding environment.
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Body projects have thus far been discussed as projects o f the self carried out to
reach personal and social goals. As illustrated in chapter two, because o f the articulation
o f selves and corporeality, bodies are located at the center o f social relations and have
been culturally situated as a form o f currency valued by the self and other. If human
bodies are the material gateways to inner subjectivity— indications o f our inner quality,
character, and social worth—then it is an easy move to claim that bodies should be
preserved, maintained, and thought o f as our most prized possessions. Actions that are
read as intentionally trying to harm this cherished entity or as detracting from its
perceived value, then, automatically gain public concern and even legislative attention.
The consequence is twofold. First, because o f the sheer amount o f attention paid
to bodies and the manner in which Western society revels in its idealized form,
individuals are compelled to use the body to reach personal, social, and political aims.
Without the presumed connection between selfness and corporeality, individuals would
not feel the need to express their identities, adhere to social standards, create
identification with others, or signal political commitments on and through their bodies.
Through this rhetorically constructed and upheld vision o f corporeality, the human body
has become, at once, a fixation and a distraction. The cultural obsession with bodies is
evident upon first glance at a billboard, magazine, television program or commercial, or
upon the first step into the classroom, workplace, or gym. More— we have become our
bodies. Our happiness is our shrinking waistline, our contentment is our flawless skin,
and our success is the adherence o f our physique to cultural standards. In short, our sense
o f self and our health is not in how we feel, but how we look. If the two do not match up.
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we do the best we ean to use our bodies to mask our inner turmoil or shortcomings
because it is that “s e lf’ that is most readily available to the other.
It is in this sense that bodies have become a distraction. Even when the
connection between selves and bodies is acknowledged as rhetorical fantasy, an
individual must exist in this world and a subject’s constant “becoming” is dependent on
the resources available to him/her. Whether or not one believes that the human body is, in
fact, connected to their authentic inner self, he or she either devotes time and attention to
their bodies to socially “pass” as a desired version o f him/her self or consciously uses
their bodies as a tool to reject this notion. The physical body is more easily modified than
an individual’s conception o f his or her inner essence is. Likewise, a social and/or
political condition is more easily modified than an ideological commitment to selfness
and corporeality.
It is within this contour that political body projects occur, modifying bodies not to
meet socially accepted versions o f corporeality, but instead using the articulation o f
selves and bodies in order to modify social and political environments. Gerard Hauser
writes, for example, o f “the body’s capacity to evoke responses to their peril and cause
from a witnessing public, to bring pressure to bear on a disciplining authority, and
sometimes even to overturn the plans o f their oppressors” (“Body Rhetoric” 137). In this
context Hauser discusses “rhetorical and political dimensions to pain” as bodies in pain
have the power to “form deep and powerful identification among an audience that feels
empathy for the sufferer’s anguish” (135). In other words, because o f the cultural
infatuation with bodies, peculiar or shocking treatment or formation o f bodies attracts
attention which can be leveraged into political action.
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The rest o f this chapter is devoted to the description and analysis o f body projects
that are politically charged as a result o f the assumptions outlined in the first two
chapters. These practices rely on society’s inclination to articulate bodies with selves and
capitalize on the social valuing o f bodies in order to affect social and political conditions.
An analysis o f these practices will further demonstrate how the meaningfulness o f bodies
is rhetorically constituted and constrained. Once the Western vision o f corporeality is
recognized as rhetorical construction, the ability for bodies to be more politically
meaningful and useful is expanded and the rhetorical power o f human bodies ean be
maximized.
The next section presents a rhetorical analysis o f the documentary o f a man who
voluntarily makes him self fat as a statement o f protest against the fast food industry. This
discussion will illustrate the reliance o f his political body modification project on
strategic rhetorical framing, a cultural fascination with bodies and valuing o f specific
types o f bodies, and an articulation o f the human form with the intangible essence o f the
self.

The Politics o f Fatness: Intentional Obesitv and Fast Food Culture

In 2004, a documentary attacking the United State’s obsession with fast food
premiered at the Sundance Film Festival in Park City, Utah. Soon after, the movie gained
momentum with audiences and media alike, sparking public interest, controversy, and
ultimately provoking change in major fast food corporations, social programs, and school
systems. The documentary, Morgan Spurlock’s Super Size Me. did not provide
Americans with information that was not already available to them. The rhetorical
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manner in which the information was presented, however, is what marked the
documentary as note-worthy, framing the issues and arguments forwarded by Spurlock as
urgent, compelling, and fascinating. Morgan Spurlock’s claim is mundane and simple:
fast food is harmful to your health. His method, however, capitalizes on Western
culture’s fascination with bodies and stigma o f fatness to command attention and demand
change.
“America has now become the fattest nation in the world,” Spurlock states
ominously at the beginning o f the film. Spurlock and his audience understand that fatness
is commonly viewed as a negative physical attribute and is thereby scolding Americans
their socially disgraceful bodies. According to the film, “37 percent o f American children
and adolescents are carrying too much fat and two out o f every three adults are
overweight or obese.” He immediately frames fatness as a problem which he later calls a
“crisis” and “a national epidemic.” The issues addressed by the documentary are highly
visible in the society in which we live, especially since they deal with the presence o f big
corporations, advertisements, physical buildings, and bodies. These “problems” are
material and we are surrounded by them every day. Spurlock’s notion is that fast food
corporations and fast food “culture” are to blame for America’s problematic growing
waistline. This perspective gives most responsibility to the major fast food distributors
and views them as the reason for the cultural conditions that foster fatness. This framing,
then, gives less responsibility to the individual who makes “poor” lifestyle choices, while
continuing to condemn fatness on bodies.
To stage an outcry against the “obesity epidemic,” Spurlock decides to take
matters onto his own body. In response to a legal ease in which a M cDonald’s plaintiff
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argues that no direct causality can be established between their food and the health
problems o f those who have begun to sue the company, Spurlock concocted his plan. In
the documentary, Spurlock wages a 30-day battle against the most prominent fast food
chain, M cDonald’s, using his body as his primary weapon. His experiment is to
“sacrifice” his own body to fast food culture in order to illuminate the dangers o f fast
food to the American consumer. “What would happen if I ate nothing but M cDonald’s
tor 30 days straight,” he asks. “Would I suddenly be on the fast track to becoming an
obese American? Would it be unreasonably dangerous? Let’s find out. I’m ready. Super
Size me.” He clearly makes it clear at the offset that his primary tool o f argumentation is
the modification o f his body. As previously mentioned, Spurlock’s argument is not a new
one, so the mere presentation o f data supporting his claims is not enough to lend cultural
urgency to his cause. To appeal to the seemingly apathetic public, then, he submits his
body to a spectacular experiment that will explicitly alter his physical form. His body,
then, is used as “a source o f evidence and argument, an exemplification or what Aristotle
would have called argument by paradigma, or example” (Hauser 138). He relies on the
manipulation o f his once socially desirable form into one that is on the “fast track” to
being socially grotesque to ja r his audience and as “p ro o f’ o f his claims.
To make his point, Spurlock confines his diet to only McDonald’s products for
thirty days with four rules: 1) He must eat three square meals a day, no exceptions; 2) He
can only eat what is available over the counter at McDonald’s for those three meals; 3)
He must “Super Size” his meal when asked; and 4) He must eat every item on the menu
at least once. The documentary follows his “progress” for the month, as well as follows
him around the country while he visits the “fattest” cities in the nation and interviews
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experts in various fields pertaining to health, fast food, and obesity. The modification of
his body becomes a particular case through which he will show causality between fast
food and fatness, as well as an attention grabbing device through which to lure media and
public interest.
Spurlock began his 30-day trial with a body that can be likened to ideal: white,
male, and thin. Before he begins his diet o f only fast food, he goes to three separate
doctors, a nutritionist, and a fitness expert to assess the preliminary state o f his body.
These scenes proudly display his body as it is being poked, analyzed, and evaluated by
these experts. All specialists agree that he is in “good,” “great,” “perfect,” and even
“outstanding” health and is “above average fitness for his age group.” Spurlock’s body at
the beginning o f the movie is offered as a symbol o f the epitome o f health. His weight is
considered to be healthy, his cholesterol levels are low, his kidney and liver functions are
optimal, and his diet is balanced. This is supplemented by his discussion o f all o f the
vices he has given up and the conscious effort made by Spurlock to attain this somewhat
ideal physique. He explains that he has given up drugs and smoking, completely abstains
from alcohol, walks every day, and eats organic foods. This portion o f the movie clearly
functions on the premises that human bodies are socially valuable and that continual
“maintenance” is required to keep them as such. Spurlock has done this throughout his
life, dedicating him self to a lifestyle that would discipline his body in accordance to
society’s standards.
Spurlock’s body modification is clearly political in nature as he offers up this
symbol o f desired healthfulness— his own body— in order to influence his cultural
environment.^ Spurlock creates a spectacle o f his body modification and supplements this
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exhibition with data that justify his actions both personally and socially in order to gain a
desired response from his audience. Without the availability o f images o f Spurlock’s
body, the public would not be interested. Because we live in a media culture, the
American public is bombarded with thousands o f images and persuasive messages a day
attempting to persuade and influence us. Spurlock creates a spectacle to separate his
political message from others and capitalizes on the public interest in bodies to lend
urgency to his cause. His spectacle o f obesity, however, must be rhetorically framed to
lend political significance to his body project in order to differentiate his practices from
other displays o f fatness.
The public, in turn, cannot validate Spurlock’s intentional “self-harm” without his
explicit political framing o f his modification. Not only does he explicitly give meaning to
his actions by describing the conditions o f his “protest” and the intentions o f his
experiment, but also through the framing o f the act o f modification through his discussion
o f the physical and mental anguish experienced as a result o f his “MeDiet.” Spurlock
needs to make clear that the conditions resulting from his body modification are
negatively affecting his body and his mind in order to provoke a desired response from
his audience. Further, his voluntary subjection to such conditions for the “greater good”
exalts his practices while condemning the practices he is mimicking.
For example, the second day o f his experiment he attempts to eat a Super-Sized
quarter pound cheeseburger, Super-Sized French fries, and a Super-Sized Coea-eola.
After 20 minutes of struggling to finally finish the meal he describes his discomfort,
sweating, nausea, and bloating and eventually vomits through the open window o f his
car. He has intentionally made him self sick to prove a point, and his condition only gets
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worse as the experiment continues. Before the end o f his session, several doctors and his
girlfriend (a vegan chef) beg him to quit his experiment and warn him that he could be
causing irreversible damage to his body that could have fatal results. On day 22 Spurlock
gives a testimonial at 2:00 a.m. describing trouble sleeping and breathing and explains
that he is worried to continue his project because he is experiencing chest pain. The next
morning his general practitioner warns Spurlock that he is pickling his liver and the
results could be life threatening. He advises Spurlock to abandon his efforts because he is
explicitly making him self sick and can easily stop the process by stopping the
experiment. Spurlock ignores his doctor’s pleas and even refuses his advice to take an
aspirin a day to avoid coronary problems. Under any other condition, his acts would be
read as self-destructive and potentially symptomatic o f mental illness. He voluntarily
subjects him self to pain and discomfort and modifies his body contrary to normative
standards, but his actions are not read as self-mutilation but rather as political protest. His
self-harm is framed instead as acts o f near-martyrdom, as he is “sacrificing” his body and
health for the public good.
Another doctor tells him that he is developing physiological signs o f addiction to
the fast food. The framing o f Spurlock’s body as becoming dependent o f the fast food
makes him (through his body) seem vulnerable and docile. As his body becomes
dependent on the food, so does his mind, constructing both as being weak and “at risk.”
Though seemingly intended to be in defense o f those dependent on fast food, this actually
contributes to the social stigmatization o f fat. This move pathologizes the drive for fast
food, and thus, the physical state o f fatness. This pathologization o f fatness further
enhances the stigma placed on the physical trait while Spurlock voluntarily subjects
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him self to this shame. This move frames “regular” fatness as a signifier o f lack o f selfrestraint, laziness, and even addiction while further framing his own practices as acts of
heroism and martyrdom. Further, Spurlock’s girlfriend discusses the negative impact the
experiment is having on their sex life. She notes fatigue, loss in stamina, and eventually,
a decrease in libido as a result o f the physical changes he is undergoing. This allows the
persuasiveness o f his body to capitalize on Western culture’s sanctification o f male
heterosexuality. According to authors Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, Western
culture is characterized by heteronormativity.''According to Lauren Berlant,
heteronormativity is a “fixed sign in the national language” (“Live Sex Acts” 297) and is
inherent in our national identity. Fleteronormativity, then, is thought o f as both a trait o f a
legitimate citizen and a liberty to be exercised by legitimate citizens. The fact that
Spurlock’s deliberate fatness has detracted from his ability to exhibit this prized trait o f
maleness further frames his acts o f modification as sacrificial for the greater good, as it
indefinitely detracts from his legitimacy as a citizen.
Spurlock’s body, once a symbol o f normative health, is intentionally modified
inside and out in order to, in turn, modify his environment. The process o f this
modification is charted and made highly visible to his audience and sensationalized
through the use o f media in order to demand attention. By the end o f the 30-day
experiment, Spurlock has added 25 pounds to his once “normal” physique, as well
increasing his body fat by 7 percent, and adding 65 points to his cholesterol level. He has
also experienced “severe damage” to his liver and kidneys and doubled his risk o f heart
disease. In short, he has taken a socially desirable body and transformed it into one that is
socially undesirable. This “undesirable” body (his end result, though overweight for his
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height, is still below the average body mass index for his age group) is prominently
displayed on a seale in a skin-tight American flag imprinted Speedo for all to see. This
vision links the symbol o f the American flag, which normally connotes positive values,
with the negative symbol o f fatness. His exhibition suggests that fast food culture is
tarnishing America’s dominant mythology, and that we ean reject this negative
association through our own bodily performances.
Spurlock’s spectacle of obesity, in fact, succeeded. Though Spurlock did not
definitively put an end to the “obesity epidemic,” put McDonald’s out o f business, or
keep customers away from the golden arches forever, he was able to gain visibility and
influence fast food culture. Soon after the film gained national attention, M cDonald’s
removed the “Super Size” option from its menu and added the “Go Active” adult Happy
Meal. McDonald’s also developed a new strategic advertising campaign that emphasized
their healthier menu options. Spurlock’s spectacle also engaged audiences, raising
awareness about fast food corporations and their products while persuading audience
members to make healthier lifestyle choices and encouraging them to, if not abandon fast
food all together, seek alternatives whenever possible.
Spurlock’s use o f his body to enact a political cause is clearly founded in the
assumption that bodies are to be used to achieve desired social aims. The success o f his
spectacle is dependent on the public fixation on physicality and the dominant reading of
bodies as tangible selves. Though functioning within these cultural assumptions,
Spurlock used them to further a political agenda. Spurlock’s ease, however, does not
stand alone. Similarly, other body modification projects utilize these same assumptions to
manipulate and influence environments. The next section will interrogate other body
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modification projects that manipulate bodies to manipulate environments. Specifically,
the following analysis foeuses on two explicitly political practices o f body
modification— hunger strikes and acts o f self immolation. Discussion o f these practices
will further illustrate the reliance o f political body projects on cultural assumptions that
link corporeality with interiority, and treat the body as a malleable apparatus to be used in
social transactions.

The Rhetoric o f Mortalitv: The Polities o f Bodilv Sacrifice

Based on the major premises o f this project, I argue that any act o f body
modification has the potential to become political in nature. For the purposes of
demonstration and analysis o f such body projects, however, 1 will focus on two other
practices o f body modification that are explicitly political in nature through the framing
o f their intent, the social reading o f their practice, and through social and political effect.
These body projects are hunger strikes and self-immolation.
Like Spurlock’s spectacle o f obesity, the hunger strike is an intentional act of
body modification that uses the manipulation o f weight and the threat o f illness or death
to seek social and/or political change. According to Gerard Hauser, “the hunger strike is
an attempt at subverting a superior power by becoming helpless before it” (“Body
Rhetoric” 139). Hauser asserts that self-starvation is a rhetorical technique that produces
a type o f body “that can capture our attention by the sheer spectacle o f its wasting away”
(139). The hunger strike has been a form o f non-violent protest for hundreds o f years.
The most famous eases o f non-violent protest through self-starvation were those o f
Mahatma Gandhi who engaged in several hunger strikes to struggle for justice and
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independence in India. Aeeording to Code Pink, a social organization o f “women for
peace,” the influence o f a hunger strike “rests on the seriousness o f the issue, and the
gravity o f putting one’s body on the line.”^ The seriousness o f an issue, however, is
relative. Hunger strikes use the spectacle o f a physically deteriorating body to make an
otherwise overlooked issue important to society through an exploited cultural interest in
corporeality. Incidentally, Code Pink has mobilized “Troops Home Fast!” a collective o f
women in opposition to the Iraq war. These women have camped out on the White House
lawn in staged fasts in an attempt to “end this illegal, unjust, and deadly war.” Though
the message o f Code Pink does not differ from that o f many other anti-war campaigns,
the manner through which they communicate this message is much different. By putting
their bodies “on the line,” these women are not only demanding public attention and
demonstrating the importance o f this issue to the interest group, but are also lending
urgency to the issue through the imminent threat o f bodily harm and death.
The attention demanded by a spectacle o f starvation depends on the predefined
premise that the physical state o f bodies is indicative o f the metaphysical state o f the self.
This presupposition frames the deteriorating body as a deteriorating self, powerless and
in the hands o f the higher authority. This strategy “poses a moral dilemma to the
authorities; either yield to save [a] life or, by refusing to fold, stand publicly condemned
for [their] moral intransigence” (Hauser 139). Clearly, the logic behind the enacting and
interpretation o f hunger striking rests on basic assumptions about the body as it is
assumed to function in relation to the self and to the other. The striker envisions his/her
body as a political tool that ean be manipulated to achieve desired social responses and
assumes that the body will be an effective rhetorical device through which he/she ean
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influence the environment. Further, the effieaey o f the body in provoking social and
political change depends on the underlying articulation o f corporeality with selfness
which places the body at the center for social relations.
One underlying necessity for the hunger strike to be successful in the modification
of one’s environment, however, is a witnessing public to interpret the act. This
interpretation is underscored by cultural assumptions o f the uses and functions o f the
body in personal, social, and political situations. Because o f the dependency on a
sympathetic witnessing public, the hunger striker must frame the body in such a way that
provokes a desired response from that public. This framing should provide adequate
signification for the practice, indicate the subject o f protest and the conditions under
which it is to occur, and create identification with the witnessing public. This is what
lends the act o f body modification its political signification as opposed to a stigmatized
association of mental illness or disease.
For example, in 1995 a group o f students went on a hunger strike to garner public
interest and support in the development o f a new program at Northwestern University.
Before the students resorted to the bodily spectacle o f self-starvation, the efforts o f the
Asian American Advisory Board (AAAB), a student organization at Northwestern
University, to establish an Asian American Studies Program at the university were
continuously thwarted despite President Henry S. Bienen’s assertion that he had “an open
mind about [the program].”^ After several months o f the university administration
considering the proposal and making excuses for the stalling o f the program, the AAAB
and other concerned students embarked on a hunger strike to attract attention to the issue
and add urgency and momentum to their requests. The hunger strikers camped outside o f
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a campus landmark, gave press interviews, and even made a documentary noting their
cause and their progress. The president responded in a letter: “I am concerned about you
and the means o f dissent you have chosen to support your proposal for an Asian
American Studies program, and particularly so because it puts you at risk. Your safety
and welfare are important to us.”^ He concludes the letter urging the students once again
to abandon their strike and to “make a commitment to us, by working with us, to bring
the Asian American experience and culture to the curriculum in a permanent, meaningful
way.” The hunger strike lasted 21 days and attracted much student, faculty, and media
attention. Though the program was not officially created until 1999, by the end o f the
strike the university had committed to developing the program and began discussing
timelines and funds.
The progress made by the AAAB was not due to the urgency o f the establishment
o f their desired program. Rather, it was the public’s arousal o f interest in the manner o f
protest that built the momentum o f the AAAB’s cause. The students who embarked on
the hunger strike worked within the public fixation on physicality and envisioned their
bodies as political tools that ean be used and manipulated to reach specific ends. Clearly,
the hunger striking o f the Northwestern students functions in a similar capacity to the
spectacle o f obesity enacted by Spurlock in his documentary. Both acts o f body
modification depend on a normative conception o f “valued” bodies and how they
function in relation to the self and to the other. This conception is used by the modifier in
order to exploit this value to gain attention and concern from an audience. The practice of
modification is contrary to cultural logic and the spectacle o f an intentionally obese or
starved body confuses and alarms the interpreter o f the act. Though the cultural
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fasci nation with bodies is what makes this method o f rhetorical performance enticing and
effective, it is the framing o f the act that lends the body political agency. An anorexic
body is altered in the same fashion as a hunger striker’s body, but the framing o f the
practice is what differentiates the two acts o f self-starvation. In light o f this framing, one
starved body signifies a disturbed self while the other signifies an emancipated political
self.
These same premises are at the heart o f other politically charged yet socially
outrageous spectacles o f bodily sacrifiée. Self-immolation, the act of surrendering one’s
mortality through bodily sacrifice, is often carried out by setting one’s own body on fire.
This act is alleged to have commenced with Thieh Quang Due, a Vietnamese Buddhist
monk, in a public protest against political oppression in Saigon. Since this symbolic act,
American activists have mimicked this practice in anti-war protesting of the Vietnam
War, the G ulf War, and the Iraq War.*' The practice o f self-immolation has its roots in
Buddhism. The Lotus Sutra, a Buddhist holy text, is said to “provide the doctrinal basis”
for self-immolation as it describes a key figure offering his own body to the Buddha
through “various acts o f self-mutilation, including burning his body” (Slosberg, “A
Question o f Violence” 25). The origins o f this practice alone, then, illustrate the
practice’s dependency on an assumed linkage between spirituality and the human form.
The most notable American act o f self-immolation was carried out by Norman
Morrison on November 2, 1965 in protest to the Vietnam War. Though it was the second
American self-immolation to occur in protest to the Vietnam War (Alice Herz was the
first), M orrison’s display generated more attention and had greater impact. M orrison’s
self-inflicted death took place at the Pentagon, where, accompanied by his one-year-old
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daughter Emily, he doused himself with gasoline and set him self on fire. This spectacle
o f political suicide occurred within 100 feet o f the office o f a man instrumental in the
continued U.S. involvement in the war— Secretary o f Defense Robert McNamera.
Though eye-witness accounts of the event contradict each other and Morrison did not
leave a suicide note explicitly outlining the meanings o f his acts, the spectacle of
M orrison’s body engulfed in flames drew international attention, and friends, family, and
media alike described the event as “a deeply personal action against the Vietnam War.”'^
The day after his political suicide, Morrison’s wife received a letter from her husband
postmarked from Washington D.C. which read: “Know that I love thee but must act for
the children in the priest’s village.” ’®Anne Morrison, Norm an’s wife, later recalled her
husband’s increasing concern about the U.S involvement in the war and his belief that “if
the war continued it would take a heavy toll on the conscience o f America.” ’’ Morrison
died for his cause, but his baby daughter survived.
M orrison’s self-immolation did not end the United State’s involvement in the war,
but his protest was recognized by the North Vietnamese government and the people o f
Vietnam “were profoundly moved by his sacrifice” (Biggs, “The Transnational Diffusion
o f Protest by Self-Immolation” 26). The government has even gone so far as to issue a
stamp in his honor, name a street after him, and his practice “became an inspiration for
further immolations in South Vietnam” (Biggs 26). To this day, Quakers, students, and
anti-war activists in America commemorate the day he took his life and consider his act
o f suicide a heroic display o f anti-war activism.
The honor Morrison received from the Vietnamese, as well as the continued
recognition Morrison receives all over the world as a hero and an advocate for peace,
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could not have been achieved without his spectacular rhetoric o f dissent. M orrison’s
actions captured worldwide attention and made the violence and tragedy “more
immediate for the American public” (Biggs 30). The implicit link between selfimmolation and spirituality fosters a public reading o f Morrison’s suicide as an action of
a spiritually sound self, lending credibility to his cause and vindicating him from a
normatively condemned act. The understanding o f a spiritually sound self is central to the
public’s exalting o f a practice that is generally thought o f as “sinful.” Further, the routine
articulation o f selfness with physicality contributes to the horror o f the spectacle— instead
o f merely watching the destruction o f a material entity, this assumption leads the
watching public to believe they are witnessing the ruin o f a soul— a grieving, pained soul.
The death o f his body (spirit) is interpreted as a great sacrifice, as Morrison has given up
his most valuable commodity to a political cause. His selfness (body) has been destroyed
in public view, making the object o f the practice’s perceived signification— those
annihilated in the Vietnam W ar—have greater meaning to the reader o f the act.
Clearly, the acts performed by the students at Northwestern University and
byNorman Morrison at the pentagon go about very different ways to affect very different
environments. The body, however, is the locus o f political agency in both cases. Further,
both cases use spectacular forms o f body modification to draw public attention and to
conduct political action. These practices parallel the spectacle o f obesity enacted by
Morgan Spurlock in his documentary. As demonstrated in all three o f these eases, the
ability to use the body as a political tool rests within the cultural assumptions discussed in
chapters two and three o f this project. The success o f political body projects relies on the
use of these assumptions, while the enactor simultaneously deconstructs them.
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Conclusions

Whether or not these practices are perceived as positive or negative, their
effectiveness cannot be denied. All o f the aforementioned cases describe acts o f body
modification that somehow modify or influence the practitioner’s surrounding
environment. The understanding o f the body as a political device stems from culturally
upheld beliefs about how the body functions in relation to the self and to the other.
Because o f the assumed relationship between selfness and corporeality, bodies are used
as tools o f the self to reach desired aims. These presumed relations are cultural fictions
that ultimately constrain the body’s potential uses, functions, and significations within
certain contexts.
The politicized body, however, cannot exist extra-eulturally. The ability for a
body to have political significance depends on its social reading within a cultural context.
The effectiveness o f political body modification projects, then, depends on an ability to
work within these confines while simultaneously rethinking these fundamental
assumptions about selfness and corporeality. Spurlock’s experiment, the students at
Northwestern, and Norman Morrison, for instance, would not have captured the attention
o f the media and the general public without the public’s fascination with bodies. The
exposure these spectacles received is a result o f this national fixation on physicality and
the social valuing of certain types o f bodies. Fueled by an ideology that assumes that
bodies publicize our inner worth, these projects encourage the normative social reading
o f these practices— an intentional modification o f a valuable body into one that is
“worthless”— in order to startle the audience and provoke confusion and awe. These
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“protests” are sensationalized because their methods are to intentionally depreciate the
value of a socially precious asset. In so doing, however, they actually cash in on this
value—they use the assumptions discussed in the first two chapters to influence their
environments.
The social fixation on physicality is linked to an assumed relationship with the
essential self, but the individual embarking on a politically charged body project does not
necessarily see it this way. In order to effectively carry out the practice to achieve
specific aims, the modifier disarticulates selfness from physicality in order to use the
body in its full political capacity. Though unhealthy, frail, and/or deformed bodies pull at
the public’s conscience and remind the spectator o f deficiency (mental, physical, social,
political) and even death, to become a political act the modifier must disarticulate self
from body to consciously perform the act and gain authority in the public eye. If the
political modifier’s “s e lf’ is socially perceived as ill or unsound then the act o f body
modification loses public significance. In order for political body projects to be effective,
the public must be concerned for the state o f the modifier’s self and body while
convinced o f the soundness o f the practices being carried out. The enactor o f the practice,
then, must simultaneously separate his/her “s e lf’ from physical form in order to sacrifice
the body for a perceived greater good, while capitalizing on the assumption that the two
are inextricably linked for rhetorical effect. The effectiveness o f such spectacles depends
on the public’s inclination to mystify acts o f modification that are seemingly incongruous
with cultural assumptions while continuing to function within them.
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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION
The substantive chapters o f this thesis provide an in-depth look at several
practices o f body modification that illustrate how the body is understood to function
personally, socially, and politically in Western culture. The cases o f Dennis Avner, Frank
Marino, Cindy Jackson, Mike Kendall, Morgan Spurlock, the AAAB, Norman Morrison,
and the like are all very different instances o f body modification that, when analyzed
together, demonstrate a set o f cultural assumptions that animate how the body will be
conceptualized, used, and socially read. These assumptions have situated the body to
function as a publication, socialization, and political device. The purpose o f this thesis,
then, has been to demystify and complicate normative conceptions o f the body and its
modification as it is presumed to function in contemporary society in order to “free up”
the body’s potential to be rhetorically meaningful in new ways.
Chapter two, “No Body Knows the Real Me; Interiorizing the Body,” discussed
the routine articulation o f the body with interiority, or the rhetorical scene o f selfhood.
Throughout the analysis, I demonstrated how this articulation can be used to collapse the
continuum o f body modification practices. I have demonstrated how very dissimilar acts,
at least at some level, utilize this conceptualization o f the body. Further, 1 reveal how this
association equates many practices that, at the level o f intentionality, should not be
likened. It is in this way that assumptions about how the body relates to the essential self
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constrict potential rhetorical uses o f the body because o f the limits it places on personal
and social readings o f the human form. Bodily practices o f selfhood are cultural practices
that produce and are produced by their own materiality. Different types o f body projects,
then, are social categories that are rhetorically constructed and thus can be rhetorically
deconstructed.
In other words, this chapter examines and problematizes the presumed connection
between the physical and the metaphysical in order to explore the rhetorical potentiality
o f the body. My argument is that there is no necessary relation between meaning and
practice. This familiar connection between the two fuels practices that ideologically
reaffirm a fantasy o f corporeality that is necessarily related to a “core” self. This fantasy
presupposes that there is an essential self, it can be realized, and that it is (or should be)
accessible to others through the exterior physical form. The cases discussed in this
chapter illustrated these assumptions at work, as well as began to show ruptures between
these associations.
Though it is not the purpose o f this project to measure the existence o f an
essential interior self, I do wish to recognize that a cultural attachment to this entity is
rhetorically perpetuated through our bodily practices. The inclination to relate one’s
physical condition to the condition o f the self is the result o f an ideological assumption
about how the body can and should function. This articulation promotes the conscious
and intentional manipulation o f the physical form to communicate our perceptions o f our
self and identity. Clearly, these effects are the products o f the rhetorical environments in
which we live. The social understanding (or misunderstanding) and acceptance (or
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rejection) o f body projects is determined by how each instance is rhetorically framed both
by the individual and their cultural context.
These self-perpetuating cultural assumptions give rise to issues o f sociality. As a
direct result o f the assumed link between the inner self and the body, public subjects
consciously manipulate the states o f their bodies to reflect feelings o f interiority. Based
on these assumptions, body modification becomes socially valued as an expression o f
selfhood— a material practice that is symptomatic o f the transcendental state within. Once
bodies are envisioned as having certain properties and associations, they are read
intertextually with other bodies according to a certain set o f standards. Thus, the third
chapter, “Modifying Society: Interiority and Corporeal Sociality,” interrogated the use o f
the body as a social device based on this intertextual relation. This chapter argued that the
social “realities” o f bodies are cultural constructions that depend on the interplay o f
rhetoric, hierarchy, and power. Bodies exist, I argue, within a rhetorical hierarchy of
corporeality that favors certain modes o f physicality and methods o f its production,
maintenance, and manipulation.
In other words, chapter three illuminates how the routine articulation o f bodies
with selfness has charged bodies with social significance and value. The cases described
in this chapter demonstrate a belief that the body either is a manifestation o f the interior
self, or that it will be socially read as such. Because o f this belief, bodies have been
articulated with qualities o f competence, character, and inner worth. This association
situates bodies as the materialization o f dominant themes in American ideology,
determining what is culturally honored and valued (and what is not). The material
transference o f such worth perpetuates this myth, which in turn pressures individuals to
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be conscious o f societal standards o f physicality. In short, within the cultural “reality” o f
the human body lies a rhetorical vision o f corporeal socialization. The shape, form, and
manner of production of a body, then, determine how bodies, and thus, selves, are
socialized.
The issues discussed in chapters two and three culminate in a discussion o f
political body projects in chapter four, “Political Selves, Political Bodies: Modifying the
Body Politic.” This chapter provided a discussion o f the body as a locus o f political
action and signification, and illustrates how such agency is drawn from assumptions
linking the body with selfness, sociality, and citizenship. The discussion o f political body
projects in this chapter worked toward opening up new avenues for conceptualizing the
body within the confines o f the aforementioned assumptions. Political body projects
begin to demonstrate how routine articulations between the essential se lf the external
self, and the social self can be rhetorically productive and politically useful. Though these
practices rely on the dominant associations I have argued to deconstruct, their ability to
modify conditions and environments depends both on the use of these assumptions and
their disarticulation.
The purpose o f chapter four, then, was to illustrate a “way in” to a nuanced vision
o f rhetorical body projects. Though I have argued for a disarticulation o f the body from
the essential self and social worth— in short, meaning from practice— it is impossible to
understand the body aculturally. As previously stated, bodies exist intertextually with
other bodies within a larger cultural context o f status and power. It is unreasonable, then,
to ask for a complete cultural reconceptualization o f the uses and functions o f the body.
My recommendation would be no better, as I to am bound by my own ideology, and thus.
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so are my notions about how the body can and should function personally, socially, and
politically. I do argue, however, for a rethinking o f the social categorization o f body
projects as a cultural fiction, and forward a more “radically empirical” way to look at the
uses o f bodies and the meanings of body modification projects.
I have, to this point, argued that the distinctions between self-maintenance, body
modification, and self-mutilation are rhetorical designations. That is not to say that
particular body projects are not productive or destructive. As I illustrated in chapter four,
acts that are socially read as “destructive,” “harmful,” or “unhealthy” can actually be
used to achieve aims that are socially acknowledged as being “productive,” “useful,” or
“industrious.” The point I have made, then, is that the rhetorical significance o f a body
project cannot be determined a priori. For example. Anorexia is socially frowned upon
while hunger strikes are viewed as being executed to achieve a dignified goal. Both
practices are the same, but their meanings, and more specifically, their effects, are very
different. Both projects are read as harmful, but one is using that assumption while
disarticulating self from body in order to achieve a desired aim. As I previously argued,
the effectiveness o f political body modification projects depends on an ability to
capitalize on cultural assumptions— in effect, rhetorically use them while simultaneously
rethinking their roles in the body modification process.
The ability for these projects to have a social or political effect, though, depends
on a cultural fixation on bodies that is perpetuated by the assumptions discussed in this
project. The rhetorical vision o f the body that our society holds simultaneously restricts
its potential uses, while allowing for these projects to produce effects. Fueled by an
ideology that assumes that bodies publicize our inner worth, political projects encourage
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the normative social reading o f these practices in order to startle the audience and arouse
confusion and awe. Without this sensationalization o f bodies, these projects would not
provoke the response necessary to influence cultural environments.
So the conclusion o f this project rests at a paradox. On one hand, it is necessary to
recognize cultural myths about the body in order to move beyond them. Assuming that
the physical state o f the body is reminiscent o f an essential inner being binds body
modification projects that could otherwise be rhetorically useful and effective in other
ways. Further, assuming that a particular act o f body modification is “destructive” or
“trivial” before examining practice, intention, and effect would be negligent.
Bodies and body modification certainly deserve further analysis and criticism
from rhetoricians. The body is bound up in discourse, ideology, power, and effect. This
project has begun to shed light on the sheer rhetoricity o f the body, but further
investigation is required to unveil and unleash the human body’s potential to be
rhetorically significant in new ways.
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